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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background and problem to be addressed 
 
Company law notions of control are not always harmonious with those of competition 
law, and thus the former may need to create its own jurisprudence informed by an 
appreciation of the purpose of merger notification under the Competition Act 89 of 
1998.  
 
My research in this study will examine the definitions of control under the 
Competition Act (the “Act”),1 comparatively to that of a company law notion of 
control as set out by the Companies Act,2 which falls legislatively short in terms of 
adequately setting out the parameters of control with regards to mergers and 
amalgamates. This paper will explore numerous matters that have come to the 
attention of the courts on these grounds.3 
 
In order to undertake the inquiry of this research, it is also important to consider the 
definitions of a merger, and of control, in terms of section 12(1)(a) and section 12(2) 
of the Act, respectively. Together with relevant sections 13A(3), 14A(1), 16(2) and 
17, setting out merger notification and implementation, compulsory notification 
necessitated by large concentrations that require commission approval, as well as 
transactions that require tribunal approval after referral from the commission, and 
lastly the Competition Appeal Court merger proceedings in order to set aside a 
Tribunal decision to set conditions on a merger or to prohibit it.  
 
Over and above considering the case law and developments in merger control and 
competition more generally, where it may have a bearing on the requirements for 
                                                        
1 As amended by the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009. 
2 71 of 2008. 
3 See Distillers Corporation SA Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Group Limited and Bulmers (SA) 
Pty Ltd and Seagram Africa Pty Ltd 08/CAC May 01; Bulmer SA et al v Distillers Corporation SA Ltd 
et al Case number 101/FN/Dec00; Cape Empowerment Trust v Sanlam Life Insurance Limited and 
Sancino Projects Limited Case no 05/X/Jan06; Ethos Private Equity Fund IV and Tsebo Outsourcing 
Case number 30/LM/Jun03; Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Limited v Naspers Limited and 
others Case number 16/FN/Mar04; Gold Fields v Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd Case No 
86/FN/Oct04; Johnnic Holdings Limited v Hosken Consolidated Limited and the Competition 
Commission Case number 65/FN/Jul 05; Competition Commission and Edgars Consolidated Retail 
Stores (Edcon) and Retail Apparel Pty Ltd Case number 95/FN/Dec02. 
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merger notification, defining control, and the legal consequences for the failure to 
adhere to these principles.  
 
A further subtopic for examination in this study being, when parties to a merger have 
failed to notify the authorities, how should the relevant competition powers, namely 
the tribunal, calculate the administrative penalty, as the Act does not provide adequate 
enough guidelines in this regard. 4  Sections 59(2) and 59(3) are insufficient in 
themselves and thus South Africa is in need of adequate legislative guidelines for 
determining the appropriate penalty. Or further if penalties prove to be insufficient 
deterrent as some might argue, whether criminal sanctions ought to be proposed and 
implemented, following and expanding upon an ever increasingly conservative stance 
the competition authorities have adopted to addressing and cure contravention of the 
Act, as evident from the recently added provision of 73A.5  
 
1.2 Purpose and aim  
 
The value of the research lies in its uniqueness and potential to contribute implicitly 
to the arena of mergers and acquisitions, the smooth functioning of a South African 
economy, and its market structures. 
 
For example the reliance on a Companies Act interpretation for what represents 
issued share capital, and whether there is a consequent need to develop the law in 
order to bridge the definitional gap for the purpose of adequately regulating merger 
notification. The ambit of which has become an important area of contestation and 
debate, now ripe to address and decide on, as organisations have employed various 
elaborate means in their endevours to avoid notification. There exist various potential 
reasons as to why this is so. The most seemingly discernable reason (although the 
case law indicates otherwise, lending itself to other instances of failure to notify to 
later be explored in this paper) being to escape the microscope of the competition 
                                                        
4 See Woodland Dairies (Proprietary) Limited and Another v Competition Commission 2010 (6) SA 
108 SCA; Southern Pipeline Contractors and Conrite Walls v The Competition Commission 
105/CAC/Dec10 and 106/CAC/Dec 10; Federal Mogul Southern Africa v Competition Commission 
[2005] 1 CPLR 50 CPAC. Further see the Competition Commission South Africa’s new ‘Guidelines 
for the determination of administrative penalties for failure to notify a merger and implementation of 
mergers contrary to the Competition Act’ February 2017 Draft. 
5 As amended. 
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authorities, in fear of the transaction under scrutiny being prohibited or restricted by 
the imposition of conditions for approval.  
 
Another reason may be that the parties to the transaction lack the resource of time and 
need to conclude the proceedings expediently. If they fail to commence operations in 
time, further financial loss may result due to the delays of administration. This 
instance would usually arise in the case of a hostile takeover or a competitive bid.  
 
Alternatively, financial institutions such as banks and investment funds that also seek 
expediency of process and cost minimisation, might jump the gun, perceiving 
themselves to not hold controlling shareholder status despite regularly engaging in 
shareholder deal-making, in brief or intermittent periods.  
 
A further potential reason being that those in opposition to the transaction taking 
place, whether they be rival bidders or competitors of the acquiring firm, may seek to 
use failure to notify as a justification in attempting to suppress the transaction, via 
interdicting its operation.  
 
It is my hope that I am able to contribute implicitly to the area of mergers and 
acquisitions, in order to effectively amalgamate and unify companies law and 
competition law with regards to the definition of control and its consequences on 
merger notification.  
 
Furthermore, to develop the current legislation in order to best achieve an outcome 
that is in alignment with the philosophy and principles set out in section 2 of the Act, 
in order to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy, as 
well as employment and advancing the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans, especially those historically disadvantaged, in realising a wider distribution 
of ownership. In addition to expanding South African participation in world markets, 
and to recognize foreign competition on a domestic level, where fair choice should be 
afforded to the consumer.6 
 
                                                        
6 S2 (a-f).  
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The purpose of the exploration regarding monetary and criminal penalties will be to 
assess and evaluate if these are effective means of curbing anti-competitive behaviour 
and creating efficiency in business and the markets. 
 
Due to the unique nature of the focus area under inquiry, there is a dearth of academic 
information on the topic necessitating the conduction of this particular research, 
making it a distinctive undertaking for exploration. However, not without its pitfalls 
as no definitive answer emerged, further there were insufficient company law 
participants in the sample which may result in validity issues due to bias and 
reactivity. 
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
1.3.1 Sample  
 
I have selected for my sample, participants that are professionals and academics in the 
fields of both competition and companies’ law to address the potential definitional 
gap, the consequences thereof and how to adequately reform the legislation in 
question or at the very least cure the problem through less intrusive means. The hand-
selected participants chosen for the study include Judge Dennis Davis,7 Advocate 
Michelle le Roux,8 Michael Katz,9 the Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs (ENS Africa) 
competition department,10 and Norman Manoim.11  
 
While it was my initial aim to divide participants as evenly as possible between the 
spheres of company law and competition law, this was not possible to achieve as the 
many experts in company law that I approached, all save one who was brave enough 
to answer,12 were unable to answer matters relating to competition law, based on a 
lack of proficiency. It is submitted that this is telling of at least a gap of knowledge 
and understanding if not an imbalance between the two pieces of legislation, and 
                                                        
7 Judge President of the Competition Appeal Court. 
8 Making regular appearances in competition matters. 
9 Corporate/commercial chairman at ENS. 
10 2016 Competition team of the year in The African Legal Awards. 
11 Tribunal member. 
12 Michael Katz. 
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perhaps further why there is such a dearth in academic and professional materials on 




The study received ethical clearance and all of the participants agreed to waive 
anonymity and confidentiality, as none would be susceptible to vulnerability as a 
result of conducting the research.13  
 
1.3.3 Data collection 
 
The data collection method for this research was conducted electronically, a 10-part 
questionnaire, 14  was sent to each participant with the relevant company or 
competition law competencies, this was executed via email correspondence. The 
participants were required to submit written answers open to their subjective 
interpretation and opinion.15  
 
1.3.4 Research design  
 
A qualitative research design was employed for the purpose of in-depth examination 
and testing of the hypothesis, purporting there to be a definitional gap with regards to 
control and the consequences that flow therefrom. This was carried out for the 
purpose of conducting and gathering a qualitative data set that are meaningful to the 
field of merger control and its development, by addressing the potential definitional 
shortcomings which companies often actively seek to either abuse, or are at risk 
where definitional confusion arises and the correct procedures are not adhered to. 
 
1.4 Research outline  
 
Having introduced the nature of the research, its purpose, aims and methodology, a 
brief chapter summary will be outlined below.  
                                                        
13 See annexure A: ethical clearance. 
14 See annexure B: questionnaire.  
15 See annexure C: answers from participants 1-5. 
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Chapter two details the definition and origins of the concept of a merger, and sets out 
the history thereof, as well as role of competition in merger regulation. This is done in 
comparison with foreign jurisdictions, looking to their competition regimes, the 
purpose of which being to examine whether the South African Act is adequate. It will 
be submitted that our domestic practice should take from the Canadian statute as well 
as African anti-trust legislation from Kenya. Both serve as solid foundational 
frameworks to work from, as both pieces of legislation provide for a wider definition 
of control, and accordingly what constitutes a merger, as the two are inextricably 
bound in a state of bilateral dependence.  
 
Chapter three explores the definitions of control in the Competition Act, in 
comparison to those provided for in the Companies Act. The purpose of which being 
to examine and test the hypothesis that there is a definitional gap between the two 
pieces of law, equating to legislative shortcomings that then become open to abuse by 
entities seeking to avoid notification and accordingly the scrutiny of the competition 
authorities, whether anti-competitive conduct be the motivating force to do so, or 
otherwise. Attempting to prove this theory will be achieved through and examination 
of the prevailing case law, listing the various forms of control. In addition to 
interpreting the data gathered from specifically selected human participants, in order 
to establish their meaning and relevance in context. Together with looking to foreign 
jurisdictions for alternative definitions that may be better suited to a M & A climate in 
general, notwithstanding being a better and more flexible fit to the South African 
economy, it will again be submitted that Canada and Kenya serve as the best 
examples, setting out a very broad notion of control.  
 
Chapter four deals with notification, which is also inextricably linked to the necessity 
for adequately defining control and consequently mergers and amalgamates. As once 
a threshold has been triggered for a large merger, it will consequently be caught for 
notification, subject to the approval of the competition authorities, with or without 
conditions such as structural remedies, or where found to be a potential but real threat 
to competition in the markets it must be prohibited, open to appeal via the 
Competition Appeal Court. 
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Chapter five explores the administrative penalty. Where parties to a large merger fail 
to notify the competition authorities, they will be in contravention of the Act, thus 
making the procedure mandatory, administrative penalties being calculated according 
to 10 per cent of the annual turnover of the undertakings in question. There is a 
progressing trend the South African authorities are evidently following, in accordance 
with a more severe stance on implementing fines for failure to notify a large merger, 
as illustrated by the recent hospital case, seeing a whopping R1 billion sanction 
imposed, agreed to via consent order, facilitated through the corporate leniency 
programme, allowing the hospital groups immunity for a section 4 offence. It is herein 
opined that this case further illustrates that firms involved in anti-competitive conduct 
may be motivated not to notify their merger in order to avoid the authorities scrutiny. 
Thus anti-competitive behaviours may be a precursor to a firm’s failure to notify. 
 
Chapter six considers the potential for the implementation of criminal sanctions for 
failure to notify, based on recent amendments to the Competition Act via the insertion 
of section 73A, criminalising cartel conduct for the first time in South Africa. In 
exploring this possibility, the foreign legislation will again be consulted, together with 


















CHAPTER TWO: MERGERS  
 
2.1 Introduction: history and origin of competition law 
This concept stems from a Latin and an Anglo-Norman French linguistic origin and 
heritage.16 However legally, the assorted global models for merger control have their 
roots in various sources predominantly from the United States with the enactment of 
the Sherman Act in 1890,17 as well as the Clayton Act,18 in addition to seeing strong 
European influence and developments. However originally stemming from Canadian 
jurisprudence, the first piece of competition legislation having been enacted in 1889, 
and is accordingly the oldest anti-trust statute in the developed world.19  
The current Canadian Competition Commission Act RSC 1985,20 strives to balance 
objectives that are frequently in conflict, with the purpose of facilitating equitable 
prospects for small enterprises attempting to gain entry and stability within the 
relevant market sectors, and further to promote adaptability and efficiency. The Act is 
federal law, comprising of both civil and criminal provisions.  
Appropriately, the South African realm of competition law that governs mergers is 
thus derived from Canadian and American jurisprudence conceived in the nineteenth 
century.21 More recently the drafters of the South African Act “borrowed liberally” 
from the Canadian Act. Most notably from section 91 defining a merger, ‘in sections 
92 to 100, merger means the acquisition or establishment, direct or indirect, by one or 
more persons, whether by purchase or lease of shares or assets, by amalgamation or 
by combination or otherwise, of control over or significant interest in the whole or a 
part of a business of a competitor, supplier, customer or other person.’22  
                                                        
16 Mid seventeenth century (in the sense ‘immerse oneself’): from Latin mergere ‘to dip, plunge’; the 
legal sense is from Anglo-Norman French merger. 
17 The Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7) is a landmark federal 
statute in the history of United States antitrust law passed by Congress under the presidency of 
Benjamin Harrison. 
18 Enacted October 15 1914, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53. 
19 The Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations Formed in Restraint of Trade. 
20 C–4.  
21 Minette Neuhoff A Practical Guide to South Africa Competition Policy & Law (2006) 11.  
22 R.S., 1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.). 
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This is clearly reflected in chapter 3 of the South African Act, of which section 
12(1)(a) sets out “[f]or the purposes of this Act, a merger occurs when one or more 
firms directly or indirectly acquire or establish direct or indirect control over the 
whole or part of the business of another firm. A merger contemplated in such a 
manner to include the purchase or lease of shares, an interest or assets, or the 
amalgamation of firms or joint ventures.23 
 
Competition law itself however, while to many may appear to be a modern evolution 
of legal practice stemming from contemporary economic policies, its origin in fact 
dates much further back to the foundations of legal principles established by the 
Roman’s in their unsuccessful attempts to regulate monopolies in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.24 Thus what was once a restraint of trade doctrine at common 
law, eventually developed and suffused over time to become know as Competition 
policy, anti-trust, or anti-monopoly (in addition to companies law and tax law), in 
order to manage macro-economic issues that a contract alone is insufficient to 
govern, 25  necessitating adequate legislation on such matters in order to facilitate 
transparency and accountability in the markets and to protect consumers and smaller 
traders alike.26  
 
2.2 The role of competition in merger regulation 
 
The aforementioned description’s set out a broad scope of what constitutes a merger, 
accordingly necessitating far reaching law and policy for adequate and effective 
regulation. The consequence of a merger is therefore the removal of a competitor 
from the market, resulting in alterations to the structure of the market, thus 
necessitating a merger control framework and system for regulation to prevent abuse 
of the merger procedure, barriers to entry for entrant players, and the domination of 
market power enabling large players to unilaterally reduce output and raise prices, 
culminating in negative ramifications affecting both the consumer and the public 
                                                        
23 See section 12(1)(b)(i)-(ii).  
24 Martin Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 62. 
25 Magna Alloys & Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 878 (A). 
26 op cit note 24 at 51 – 62. 
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interest.27  The role of competition policy can thus be viewed for the purpose of 
enhancing consumer welfare. As is evidenced in section 2(b), stipulating one of the 
purposes of the Act as being to promote competition in South Africa in order to 
“provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices”. 
 
The function of competition policy being, to act as a regulatory tool, facilitating 
economic functional efficacy in a free market environment. Implemented by the 
competition channels of authority, investigative bodies and legislated practice 
adjudicated by the competition courts. The commitment of which being to act as a 
conduit for pro-competitive activity facilitating and balancing business and consumer 
welfare and protection,28 as well as the public interest and society in its entirety.29 
 
Not only must competition law and companies law be aligned and up to date with best 
corporate and business practice, but must also show due regard to those that have 
been disadvantaged by previous historical inequality and social injustices of the past, 
in line with the principles enshrined in our Constitution.30 
 
Unlike other areas of competition law and policy, when it comes to merger control 
and regulation, the governing legislation can be said to be “prophylactic in nature”,31 
as it aims to eradicate the abuse of market power by preventing its formation at the 
start, therefore ex-anti control is exercised where a particular threshold is met.32  
 
Where such a merger is caught, dependent on its size, the undertakings involved are 
legally required to furnish the Competition Commission with prior notification 
regarding the intended large or intermediate merger, where the system is mandatory. 
Small mergers on the other hand only require voluntary notification, unless any of the 
firm’s party to the merger is under investigation, or respondent to a pending 
proceeding with regards to a prohibited practice allegation. While large and 
                                                        
27 Ibid at 224-228. 
28 See s2(b) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998.  
29 Glaxo Wellcome Plc and Another v Competition Commission of South Africa [2000] ZACT 33 (28 
July 2000). 
30 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
31 Michael Trebilcock, Ralph A Winter, Paul Collins and Edward M. Iacobcci  ‘The law of Economics 
in Canadian Competition Policy’ (2002) 131. 
32 Ibid.  
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intermediate mergers cannot be implemented until the competition authorities have 
granted approval, after they have conducted an analysis examining the potential pro-
competitive or anti-competitive effects the merger may pose.33  
  
2.3 What constitutes a merger? 
 
A merger can be described as the coming together or “marriage” of two entities 
coalescing and fusing into one consolidated new entity. Within the ambit of this 
definition there are different categories further defining mergers.  
 
Horizontal mergers involve the supply of the same market industry products by 
competitors within the same geographical area, as evidenced in the case law on the 
topic. 34  With regards to horizontal mergers, the governing competition policy is 
premised on the notion that an increase in market concentration resulting in an 
increase in market power. The consequence of which being, a hike in prices, 
subsequently leading to inefficient market output levels, in addition to the 
transmission of wealth, choice, and variety from consumers to traders.35 There is a 
clear an undeniable nexus showing a causal relationship between an increase in 
market power correlating to greater market power, this is especially evident in 
extreme cases of mergers in monopoly markets that generate high barriers to entry.36 
These mergers warrant the highest level of concern in competition, and are thus 
prohibited under section 4(b), unless approved under the Act after notification (where 
required) and consideration. They can however also result in efficiencies due to 
economies of scale and pooled resources.37 Economic theory lays the foundation for 
evaluating market conditions in order to assess the impact of a merger.38 However 
ultimately each matter must be heard and assessed on a case-by-case basis, as each 
merger differs.39  
 
                                                        
33 Philip Sutherland and Katharine Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2014) 8-3 – 8-9. 
34 See American Natural Soda Ash Corporation v Competition Commission 2005 6 SA 158 (SCA). 
35 Maher M. Dabbah ‘EC and UK Competition Law Commentary, Cases and materials’ (2004) 131. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Op cit note 24 at 225. 
38 Ibid at 132. 
39 Ibid at 269. 
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Vertical mergers comprise of players operating at different levels of the supply chain, 
for example from manufacturer to distributor and therefore may include both forward 
and backward integration, through the acquisition of a customer or a supplier, which 
may lead to structural changes in an industry. 40  Vertical mergers raise less of a 
competition concern comparatively to their horizontal counterparts, however can still 
lead to raised costs, barriers to entry, and upstream interdependence.41 
 
Accordingly direct competition is not per se eliminated, as the relationship is not 
horizontal in nature. Accordingly infringements are assessed on a case-by-case basis 
under section 5 of the Act, in terms of the rule of reason, where it can be shown to 
have resulted in the substantial lessening of competition.42 
 
A conglomerate encompasses everything else, including unrelated businesses, 
different markets, products, and consumers, thus the parties thereto have no apparent 
economic relationship. This may include geographic extension and product extension 
mergers.43 The purpose for which being to maximise efficiency, and usually have 
little to no effect on competition as the firms involved operate in different markets, 
neither does it affect the structure of the market or levels of concentration. Yet still it 
may have socio-political ramifications where too much power is gained by such an 
entity.44 
 
Acquisitions on the other hand, while often used synonymously, differ from mergers 
in that a merger incorporates two similar sized undertakings that combine into one. 
The names of the firms will generally also merge to form anew, notwithstanding the 
event in which the parent firm name is used, one of the two will usually emerge as the 
dominant management. While acquisitions deal with for example, where a larger firm 
buys a smaller firm, which then becomes its subsidiary, having acquired all of the 
target firm’s stock. This may be executed in a manner that could either be friendly 
and negotiated amicably, or hostile for the acquiree, where it is not freely elected by 
                                                        
40 Ibid at 226. 
41 Ibid at 227. 
42 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), is a US antitrust case in 
which the United States Supreme Court overruled Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 
220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
43 Op cit note 24 at 225. 
44 Ibid at 227. 
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both parties, but rather through the compulsion of one of them, where alternative 
methods of escape or rescue are unavailable, and there is no room left for poison pills 
or white knights to avail the situation, resistance is simply futile.45 
 
The guiding philosophy of mergers and acquisitions can accordingly be seen as an 
endevour to maximise value creation through the synergy between divisions, 
increasing cost reductions by applying economies of scale and scope, facilitated by 
the transference of competencies and shared infrastructure. In order to do so 
effectively, especially within a South African economic landscape, considerations and 
respect of cultural diversity must be given due regard for effectual implementation, 
growth, mere survival or an opportunity to exit and escape.  
 
2.4 EU merger control guidelines  
 
The dominant legislation regarding merger control can be found in the European 
Union Community Merger Regulation (139/2004), and the Implementing Regulation 
(802/2004), as amended.46 While the former provides for the assessment criteria with 
which to evaluate a concentration, the latter relates to procedural matters, such as 
notification protocol. In late 2016, the European Commission released further 
guidelines and a series of notices, updating those published in 2008,47 and 2013,48 in 
order to aid parties to a transaction that may fall within the ambit of EU Merger 
Regulation.  
A merger is defined under European competition law when ‘change of control on a 
long lasting basis results from (a) the merger of two or more previously independent 
undertakings… (b) the acquisition… of direct or indirect control of the whole or parts 
of one or more other undertakings.’ 49  Prior notification for these transactions is 
required, followed by commission approval and clearance, before the implementation 
of the concentration may proceed. In instances where EC Regulation is not applicable 
                                                        
45 Case No COMP/M.6381 – Google/Motorola Mobility. Commission decision pursuant to Article 
6(1)(b) of Council Regulation No 139/2004. 
46 (1269/2013). 
47 Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice. 
48 Notice on the Simplified Procedure. 
49 Art. 3(1), Reg 139/2004. 
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to the transaction, it will still be subject to the domestic merger control laws and 
guiding policies of the EU member state(s) relevant to the merger.50  
 
2.5 The relevant South African legislation 
 
2.5.1 The Competition Act 
 
Taking heavily from the jurisdictions detailed above as the forerunners to the 
development of competition law, South Africa followed suit with similar frameworks, 
beginning with the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act 24 of 1955, followed 
by the Maintenance and the Promotion of Competition Act 96 of 1979, being the 
predecessor to the current Competition Act, having been jettisoned for its 
ineffectiveness, 51  and accordingly replaced with Act 89 of 1998 which became 
effective on 1 September 1999, in order to address South Africa’s economic and 
political history.52 Followed by the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009, which 
came into force on 1 April 2013 with regards to section 6, and on 1 May 2016 in 
terms of section 12 and 13. 
 
The preamble of the current Act sets out that due regard must be given to previously 
discriminative practices and that equality must be afforded to all in order to facilitate 
“full and free participation in the economy by all South Africans.”53 
 
Mergers are regulated by chapter 3 of the Competition Act, setting out matters for 
consideration and who has the authority to give such consideration in the merger 
assessment process,54 namely the Tribunal and the Commission, these competition 
authorities duties are provided for in terms of chapter 4 of the Act. As the purpose of 
competition law is regulatory, the merger control provisions under Chapter 3 
accordingly detail the relevant procedures governing these transactions. Section 11 
sets out the thresholds and categories of mergers. Section 12 the legal definition of a 
merger. Section 13 and 14 detail notification, implementation and investigation by the 
                                                        
50 Reg 139/2004.  
51 Mouton Commission 1977. 
52 Op cit note 24 at 87. 
53 Preamble amended by s. 22 of Act 39 of 2000.  
54 See section 12A(1) of the Competition Act.  
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Competition Commission. Section 15 handles merger revocation by the Commission. 
Section 16 deals with Tribunal merger proceedings. Section 17 Competition Appeal 
Court proceedings, as well as merger procedure intervention under section 18.  
 
Only after such careful consideration are the empowered authorities permitted to 
prohibit or authorise (with or without conditions), or to refer mergers upon 
notification. Parties to the merger may also appeal such a decision in terms of section 
16(1)(a)-(b) read with section 13A(3). The Commission has no power with regards to 
large merger and is obligated to refer notice to the Tribunal complete with a 
recommendation as to whether implementation should be approved or not.55 Whereas 
small mergers on the other hand need only be notified on the bases set out in section 
13(5)(b) and section 14(1)(b) detailing that after considering the merger, the 
Commission must issue the prescribed certificate either declaring its approval, 
conditions or prohibition. 
 
Merger evaluation is a two-pronged test in terms of section 12A(1) comprising of 
both purely economic competition factors of consideration weighed against public 
interest factors provided for in section 12A(3), relating to the effect that the merger 
will have on a specific industrial sector or region, employment, small or previously 
disadvantaged firms being able to gain market entry, and the ability for local business 
to compete as international players in foreign markets.  
 
The factors set out in section 12A(2) relate to the substantial lessening of competition, 
while there are 8 factors for consideration, namely the actual and potential level of 
import competition in the market, the ease of market entry, concentration and history 
of collusion in the market, the degree of countervailing market power, growth 
innovation and product differentiation within the markets, the nature and extent of 
vertical integration within a market, whether the business or a part thereof of a party 
to the merger has failed or is likely to do so, and finally whether the merger will result 
in the removal of an effective competitor. The list is not exhaustive nor is there any 
                                                        
55 See section 14A(1). 
 21 
hierarchy to the list, neither will all factors be relevant to each case, again following a 
Canadian approach.56 
 
2.5.2 The Companies Act 
 
On the other hand the other governing piece of legislation dealing with mergers is the 
“new” Companies Act 71 of 2008, which came into force on 1 May 2011 having 
undergone a substantial overhaul especially with regards to mergers comparatively to 
its precursor the 1973 Act. Having since been heralded for bridging many of the 
legislative gaps between competition law and companies’ law.  
 
However it is asked herein whether this is sufficient, or if there are still gaps in both 
definition and procedure that need to be further fused together in order to best align 
the companies legislation with that of competition law.  
 
An amalgamation or merger is defined in terms of section 1 as ‘a transaction, or series 
of transactions, pursuant to an agreement between two or more companies resulting in-  
(a) the formation of one or more new companies, which together hold all of the 
assets and liabilities that were held by any of the amalgamating or merging 
companies immediately before the implementation of the agreement, and the 
dissolution of each of the amalgamating or merging companies; or 
(b) the survival of at least one of the amalgamating or merging companies, with or 
without the formation of one or more new companies, and the vesting in the 
surviving company or companies, together with any such new company or 
companies, of all of the assets and liabilities that were held by any of the 
amalgamating or merging companies immediately before the implementation of 
the agreement’. 
 
Under the Companies Act, mergers and amalgamations are specifically dealt with in 
section 113 read with section 115 and 116, found in the provisions of Chapter 5, 
setting out fundamental transactions, takeovers and offers. Detailing proposals for 
amalgamation or merger, setting out requirements, namely the satisfaction of the 
                                                        
56 Op cit note 24 at 269.  
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solvency and liquidity test, as well as a written agreement between the proposed 
merging parties setting out the terms and manner of implementation, respectively.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
In summary it is clear the two pieces of legislation differ with regards to defining 
control for the purposes of merger regulation. This paper will explore whether these 
differences are material, and whether the difference may be exploited by entities 
planning to merge, but seek to avoid the scrutiny of the authorities by failing to notify. 
It is apparent from the comparison of these two pieces of legislation that problems are 
sure to still arise despite the introduction of the new Act, due to how they differ at a 
definitional level with regards to what constitutes a merger, as a merger is defined on 
the basis of control thus need to define control is essential. It is submitted that to cure 
the discrepancy, rather than reforming both pieces of legislation, the definition of both 
mergers and control should be slightly relaxed to make room for a broader 
understanding of what constitutes a merger as set out in the Competition Act, which 
would make bridging the gap easier in order to align the two provisions for a better 
fit. This would benefit competition as well as business, in as much that merging 

















CHAPTER THREE: DEFINING CONTROL  
 
3.1. Background and context 
 
The delineation and characterisation of control is a crucial component to the section 
12(1) definition of a merger. However, the manner in which it is used in the 
subsection is not specifically expressed at all in the Act. This legislative failure has 
lead to interpretive uncertainty, ‘[a]s yet, the competition authorities have not decided 
what the term “control” really means.57  For example in Distillers, counsel for the 
appellant argued that control constituted 50 per cent plus one share.58  
 
The outcome of the data render similar findings, in as much that opinions differ, 
creating uncertainty and indicating a need to resolve the matter, in order to settle on 
an adequate definition of control for merging parties who may be caught for 
notification, as failure to follow mandatory notification procedures will result in 
serious time and cost implications for the business of the parties to the transaction. 
The provisions of the Companies Act will thus be consulted in comparison to aid the 
definitional process where it is possible.  
 
3.2 Under the Competition Act 
 
In terms of section 12(2) ‘A person controls a firm if that person –  
 
(a) beneficially owns more than one half of the issued share capital of the firm;  
(b) is entitled to vote a majority of the votes that may be cast at a general meeting of 
the firm, or has the ability to control the voting of a majority of those votes, either 
directly or through a controlled entity of that person;  
(c) is able to appoint or to veto the appointment of a majority of the directors of the 
firm;  
(d) is a holding company, and the firm is a subsidiary of that company as 
contemplated in section 1(3)(a) of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973);  
                                                        
57  Op cit note 33 at 8-14. 
58 Distillers Corporation SA Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Group Limited and Bulmers (SA) Pty 
Ltd and Seagram Africa Pty Ltd 08/CAC May 01 354. 
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(e) in the case of a firm that is a trust, has the ability to control the majority of the 
votes of the trustees, to appoint the majority of the trustees or to appoint or change 
the majority of the beneficiaries of the trust;  
(f) in the case of a close corporation, owns the majority of members’ interest or 
controls directly or has the right to control the majority of members’ votes in the 
close corporation; or  
(g) has the ability to materially influence 59  the policy of the firm in a manner 
comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, can exercise an 
element of control referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f).’ 
 
While s 12(2)(a) – (f) imply a numerus clausus, it is not in fact an exhaustive list 
(supposedly). 60  The tribunal had previously confirmed this assertion in Bulmer, 
acknowledging that there were many instances of mergers that were not listed, for 
example the purchase of assets as set out in s 12(1)(a).61  
 
As tempting as it may be to suggest an amendment of s 12(2), for the inclusion of 
further cases where control has taken place, this may only serve to further ostensibly 
portray it as a closed list, leaving open for gaps at risk of being open to abuse, or 
serving as a danger to merging parties who will unwittingly be caught for notification.  
 
To cure these issues it is suggested that control be defined in terms of and in relation 
to its use in s 12(1), for the purposes of clarity and certainty. Further, s 12(2) should 
be made more general and open, simplifying it to a broader notion, as that offered by 
s 12(2)(g) referring to the ability to ‘materially influence’ the firm in a manner 
comparable to control. However it must be noted, the last subsection of the provision 
may also lead to negative joint control, in instances where minority shareholders have 
the ability to veto a business plan.62 S12(2) should consequently include a substantive 
element of control in line with the single economic entity approach.63 It is opined that 
the legislation should provide a clearer and more general point of reference as to 
                                                        
59 Own emphasis.  
60 Ethos Private Equity Fund IV and Tsebo Outsourcing Case number 30/LM/Jun03 23-24; Caxton and 
CTP Publishers and Printers Limited v Naspers Limited and others Case number 16/FN/ 46. 
61 Bulmer SA et al v Distillers Corporation SA Ltd et al Case number 101/FN/Dec00 13-14. 
62 Op cit note 24 at 236. 
63  This functional, rather than formalistic, approach in identifying the entity to which liability is 
attributed under competition law makes it possible for two or more separate legal entities to be found to 
form a single economic unit. 
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when a transaction is a merger, subject to review on a rebuttable presumption. ‘[T]o 
provide for a more realistic, if less exact, definition of control.’64 As it is submitted 
that the bright-lined categories set out in section 12(2)(a)-(c) give rise to various 
problems, namely, subsection (a) is an odd provision in that it stipulates only in terms 
of an owner and not a nominee. Courts have also at times interpreted the section in a 
restrictive manner based on economic interest,65 and at other times in a manner that is 
not compatible with company law.66 Subsection (c) appears to be in conflict with the 
company law approach, thus is recommended to also look to section 3 of the 
Companies Act for a more accurate phrased provision. 
 
3.2.1 The case law 
 
The courts have applied both formalistic and literalistic approaches to constructing the 
meaning of the expression control, a literalistic approach being favoured,67 in order to 
interpret the provisions of s12(1) dealing with direct forms of control, and the indirect 
forms of control set out in s12(2). A bright-line method being employed to the later 
section, in order to immediately illuminate the listed conduct as instances where 
control as been deemed to have been acquired.68 This creates a level of certainty, in 
respect of relieving pressure on the definition of control, ‘[h]owever the competition 
courts interpretation of the provision is open to criticism’, as the provisions run the 
risk of being constructed in an overly formalistic manner, which further serves to 
potentially undermine voluntary compliance.69 
 
3.2.1.2 Change of control 
 
While the Act is still relatively new and its infancy, having come into effect on 1 
September 1999, its innovative nature has generated a wealth of case law with regards 
to defining what constitutes a merger. The bulk of these matters deal with the question 
of whether a change in control has taken place, and will be considered below in 
                                                        
64 Op cit note 33 at 8-16. 
65 Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Limited v Naspers Limited and others Case number 16/FN 
66 Ethos Private Equity Fund IV and Tsebo Outsourcing Case number 30/LM/Jun03. 
67 Supra note at 61.  
68 Supra note 66 at 16, 34, 35, 42, & 43. 
69 Op cit note 33 at 8-16. 
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assessing whether the competition authorities have adequately defined control in 
legislative theory, as well as in interpretation and practical application thereof. 
 
In the seminal case of Distillers,70 the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) was faced 
with the decision as to whether a transaction constituted a merger, where a change had 
taken place in direct (but not indirect) control.71 
 
The matter hinged on the fact that both appellants were owned by a mutual group of 
controlling shareholders, and thus in proposing to merge (acquisition of assets and 
liabilities of one by the other), contended that, upon such merger, no change of 
control would take effect, negating the need to file a merger notification with the 
competition authorities.72  
 
The Competition Appeal Court had two methods of approach at its disposal in 
deciding on the Distillers matter,73 namely that it could ameliorate and revolutionise 
the effect of the onus of notification in employing a purposive construction of what 
will be caught as a merger, by reading in an implied exemption in relation to 
transactions where immediate controllers may change, yet the ultimate controllers 
remain constant (as was contended by the merging parties).74 
 
However it was in the alternative that the Appeal Court rather adopted a literal 
interpretation, construing any change of control as a merger, whether as the result of a 
direct or indirect change in shareholding.75  
 
The court held that it was inconsequential as to whether there had been a shift in 
indirect control, i.e. in the ultimate shareholding, but rather what was of significance 
was that a change in direct control had taken place, meaning the transaction was 
caught by the definition and thus notifiable as a merger, obligating the merging 
parties to comply with filing procedures.76 
                                                        
70 Supra note 58. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid.  






‘Thus, the acquisition of the assets by the first applicant would bring about the 
acquisition of control as between first appellant and second appellant, 
irrespective of what effect the transaction itself might have on the ultimate 
control that the shareholders of the two appellants exercised’.77 
 
The court further expressed that the Act is silent, as no express provision has been 
legislated detailing transactions between a company and its wholly owned subsidiary.  
 
In deciding on the same matter prior to appeal, the Tribunal read in an exception for 
where entities are part of the same ‘single economic entity’. Finding on the facts that 
the parties had failed to show that the three controlling shareholders comprised a 
single economic entity.78 
 
Whilst not enslaving itself to literalism in adopting this approach, the CAC clearly did 
so for valid policy reasons in order to interpret when a merger is caught in a 
comprehensive fashion, so that a greater number of mergers fall under the inspection 
competition authorities. 
 
‘…the purpose of merger control envisages a wide definition of control… the 
relevant market.’79 
 
The Competition Appeal Court went on to express a further principle that was to be 
thematically shadowed in cases to follow, viz. more than one firm can control another 
at the same time.  
 
‘The wording of section 12(2) clearly contemplates a situation where more 
than one party simultaneously exercises control over a company. This 
situation can be illustrated with the following example: A beneficially owns 
more than half the issued share capital of the firm. He concludes an 
agreement with B in order that the latter may run the business. B agrees 
                                                        
77 Ibid at 27.  
78 Supra note at 61. 
79 Supra note 58 at 36. 
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provided that he obtains control over the appointment to the board of 
directors as well as senior staff and marketing policy. In such a situation A 
would control the firm as defined in terms of section 12(2)(a) and B would 
exercise control as defined in term[s] of section 12(2)(g). In short, while A 
would have ultimate control, B would have control of a sufficient kind to bring 
him within the ambit of control as defined by section 12.' 80 
 
In Cape Empowerment Trust v Sanlam Life Insurance Limited (et al), 81  a later 
decision deciding on what constitutes a merger, the Tribunal took note that 
‘[s]imultaneous control of a company for purposes of section 12 by two or more 
entities is a concept specifically acknowledged by the Distillers case.’82 
 
This conclusion has far reaching ramifications, not always immediately apparent to 
those operating in business and trading in the markets, who often believe the converse 
to be correct, i.e. that there is only a singular controller to be caught, to the exception 
of situations dealing with joint ventures, and consequently a joint control dynamic 
within the stipulated definition of a merger under section 12(1). Thus from a 
commerce perspective, the objective of merger control should be to only intervene 
where the circumstance is such that the said sole controller passes the control to 
another through an act of cession.  
 
In accordance with the Act, control may be established directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of concluding the presence of a merger.83 Section 12(1) sets out how direct 
control is established, while indirect control is not always as apparent or 
straightforward to determine, section 12(2) attempts to list instances of indirect 
control in order to assist and guide the courts in determining when control has 
indirectly passed. Naturally the list is said to be non-exhaustive, as a variety of forms 
of indirect control may exist, including new potential manifestations of control that 
may exist in the future. The influence the exercise of control culminates in must 
however be material, in accordance with s12(2)(g).  
                                                        
80 Supra note 58 at 25. 
81 Case no 05/X/Jan06. 
82 Cape Empowerment Trust v Sanlam Life Insurance Limited and Sancino Projects Limited Case no 
05/X/Jan06 54. 
83 Primedia Ltd v Competition Commission 39/AM/May06 12/02/2007 135. 
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The Bulmer matter offers a narrow construction of direct control, only regarding the 
immediate owners of assets as direct controllers. As such majority shareholders would 
amount to indirect controllers. This seems illogical and would further result in direct 
control scarcely being established at all.84  
 
As is evident, the Distillers case illustrates the possibility for there to be more than 
one controller at play simultaneously, and that the concept of a merger should be 
construed expansively.85  
 
Accordingly the fear of hegemonic designs on the part of their rivals has inspired 
private players to interdict the implementation of proposed mergers involving their 
competitors, while still in their incipiency, conduct that can be viewed as a potentially 
powerful tool to thwart, or at least hamper rival ambitions. A sterling example of such 
efforts to thwart rivals Naspers, is illustrated in the Caxton matter. Caxton brought the 
matter forward with regards to restructuring M-Net’s businesses, as preceding the 
transaction, Naspers owned shares, directly and indirectly in M-Net, cumulating to a 
holding of less than 50 per cent of an economic interest in M-Net. However, it was 
common cause that prior to the merger, MNH 98 held 52 per cent of M-Net’s shares, 
making it the controlling shareholder. This company was a joint venture between 
Naspers and two other firms, thus Naspers and its fellow shareholders jointly 
controlled M-Net. Subsequent to concluding the transaction, Naspers significantly 
increased its direct interest in M-Net by over 30 per cent. Accordingly post 
transaction, while it’s direct interest remained below 50 per cent, its cumulated direct 
and indirect interests now were in excess of 50 per cent.86   
 
Counsel for Caxton based its argument on the Ethos case, submitting that Naspers had 
crossed the bright-lined tests set out in section 12, as its holdings had now crossed the 
50 per cent threshold, thus constituting a merger. However the Tribunal held that the 
facts of the case distinguished it from the Ethos matter, in as much that part of the 
holdings in M-Net were held indirectly, further submitting that, even if indirect 
holdings were to be counted, the recognised controller should at least control the 
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indirect shareholdings. The relevant amount of shareholdings to take Naspers over the 
threshold was held in MNH 98, and that company was the subject of joint control and 
not Naspers sole control, accordingly that stake could not be counted in the Tribunals 
determination, and without it no line had been cross and it was thus found that there 
was no change in control, and therefore did not constitute a merger.87 
 
Where a joint venture constitutes a merger as per s12(1), merger control laws will 
apply. However, the Act does not specifically provide for a definition with regards to 
what a join venture is, the only stipulation being that ‘control may be obtained by one 
or more firms’ which is problematic in itself.  
 
The courts in Distillers interpreted this to mean more than one firm could 
simultaneously yet separately control another firm, therefore rejecting a unitary 
approach to control. This is correct, as it asserts the legislatures’ acknowledgement of 
joint control constitutes a legitimate form of control.88 The commission has published 
a non-binding practitioners guide, accordingly it is submitted that the Act might need 
to include further details in order to determine when such instances of control have 
been established.  
 
Section 12(2) sets out a ‘person’ will have control when falling into a bright-lined 
category. This creates further complications with regards to joint controllers, who 
may each fall into differing categories. The two forms of control are distinct and thus 
a joint controller may consequently become a sole controller at a later stage.89 
 
As the Act does not specify what constitutes join control, the courts have interpreted it 
to be shown through either an express or tacit agreement between the various 
controllers, which ‘ally themselves’,90 strongly.91 As such, intention to control must 
be material, however the courts held that an agreement to act together in a single 
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resolution is sufficient, as it would result in the control structure being robustly 
altered by the intended joint action.92 
 
This treatment of the notion of joint control may however produce deleterious results, 
with regards to minority shareholder voting agreements. Accordingly, the interval of 
long-lasting control will be exercised through the joint agreement, rather than in terms 
of whether the resolution will impact the structure of the target firm. Therefore this 
constraint should be relaxed.93 It is still imperative to adequately define joint control 
for the purpose of detecting collusive agreements that would constrict or substantially 
lessen competition in the markets,94 thus determining whether the transaction would 
pass or be prohibited.95 Consequently, they can be perceived as separate, yet related 
issues for consideration by the authorities. 
 
It may further be helpful in the context of providing an explanation on the meaning of 
control, to examine the definition of a business, and the role it plays in establishing 
control.96 
 
The definition of a business has further sparked debate, when regarded in terms of 
what constitutes a merger. The Edon matter illustrated these deliberations, having 
been brought before the tribunal by the commission for the failure to notify a merger. 
The crux of the matter hinged of whether a debtors book of an insolvent company 
amounted to a merger. It was argued by the commission that it was, on the grounds 
that it was an acquisition of assets. Conversely, the tribunal held this was not the test, 
and that the issue at hand was rather whether the assets constituted whole or part of a 
business of another firm, 97  concluding with the assertion that it did, as it gave 
strategic value to a firm in this market, and amounted to a market share, consequently 
part of a business.98  
 
                                                        
92 Ibid at 31-33. 
93 Op cit note 33 at 8-37. 
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However, it was noted that not all book debts could amount to a merger, and 
consequently each matter must be interpreted on the individual facts of the case.99 
In doing so the tribunal considered the practices of foreign jurisdictions in dealing 
with issues of this nature, emphasising a reliance on the EC and US approaches. It 
was finally held a merger had taken place and Edcon was fined for failure to notify.100  
 
3.3 Defining control under the Companies Act in comparison to section 12 
 
With regards to the provisions set out in the Companies Act of 2008, there are a 
number of sections relating to mergers, as aforementioned in chapter 2, more 
specifically when trying to establish a solid definition of control under this Act, the 
following provisions will apply. 
 
3.3.1 Section 2: Related and inter-related persons, and control 
 
‘(1) For all purposes of this Act— 
(a) an individual is related to another individual if they—  
(i) are married, or live together in a relationship similar to a marriage; or  
(ii) are separated by no more than two degrees of natural or adopted consanguinity 
or affinity; 
(b) an individual is related to a juristic person if the individual directly or indirectly 
controls the juristic person, as determined in accordance with subsection (2); and 
(c) a juristic person is related to another juristic person if—  
(i) either of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or the business of the 
other, as determined in accordance with subsection (2);  
(ii) either is a subsidiary of the other; or  
(iii) a person directly or indirectly controls each of them, or the business of each 
of them, as determined in accordance with subsection (2). 
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), a person controls a juristic person, or its business, 
if— 
(a) in the case of a juristic person that is a company—  
(i) that juristic person is a subsidiary of that first person, as determined in 
accordance with section 3(1)(a); or  
(ii)  that first person together with any related or inter-related person, is— (aa) 
directly or indirectly able to exercise or control the exercise of a majority of 
the voting rights associated with securities of that company, whether pursuant 
to a shareholder agreement or otherwise; or (bb) has the right to appoint or 
elect, or control the appointment or election of, directors of that company 
who control a majority of the votes at a meeting of the board;  
(b) in the case of a juristic person that is a close corporation, that first person owns 
the majority of the members’ interest, or controls directly, or has the right to control, 
the majority of members’ votes in the close corporation;  
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(c) in the case of a juristic person that is a trust, that first person has the ability to 
control the majority of the votes of the trustees or to appoint the majority of the 
trustees, or to appoint or change the majority of the beneficiaries of the trust; or  
(d) that first person has the ability to materially influence the policy of the juristic 
person in a manner comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, 
would be able to exercise an element of control referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).  
(3) With respect to any particular matter arising in terms of this Act, a court, the Companies 
Tribunal or the Panel may exempt any person from the application of a provision of this Act 
that would apply to that person because of a relationship contemplated in subsection (1) if the 
person can show that, in respect of that particular matter, there is sufficient evidence to 
conclude that the person acts independently of any related or inter-related person.’  
 
Delport has asserted that section 2 is based on section 12 of the Competition Act,101 
and Davis JP acknowledges the importance of the section in relation to defining 
control, implying it may be superior to that set out in section 12 of the Competition 
Act. Adv. Le Roux further makes reference to section 2, concluding it to be an 
adequate characterisation of the notion of control, and somewhat more comprehensive 
than that of section 12. 
 
Subsection 1 deals with related and interrelated persons,102 which may be helpful to 
consult with regards to joint ventures, as the Competition Act only makes reference to 
a ‘person’ falling into one of the bright-lined categories, where the is more than one 
controller and different controllers fall into different categories set out in section 
12(2). Section 2 thus gives a more comprehensive guide to related individuals and the 
concept of interrelation with regards to control over a juristic person, and subsidiary 
relationships.103 
 
It is thus submitted that this provision may serve to provide clarity in a particular 
matter when assessing whether control has been established, in concurrent 
consultation with Issue 3 of the Practitioners Guide, dealing with issues relating to 
joint control.  
 
In his commentary, Delport further notes control may also be established over the 
business of a juristic person however acknowledges that under section 2(1)(c)(ii) a 
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juristic person may be a subsidiary.104 However section 3 falls somewhat short in that 
it only provides for a company to be a subsidiary of that juristic person.105 
 
Subsection 2 sets out control of a juristic person or its business, this must be read with 
section 3(1) where such a person acts together with a related or interrelated person in 
manners contemplated in section 3(1)(a)(i)-(ii). 
 
It is fundamental to understand when and how person are related with regards to 
section 2, in order to establish whether other provisions of the Companies Act might 
apply, in addition to effectively regulating transactions that involve related persons, as 
the terms ‘related’ is widespread throughout the Act, potentially triggering the 
provisions of section 41(1) setting out the issuing of shares to related persons, as well 
as section 44 and section 45, detailing the rules governing financial assistance in 
respect of the acquisition of shares, or to related persons, respectively. 106  As 
aforementioned, section 2 and section 3 need be read together, as looking to 
subsidiary relationships alone would be insufficient.  
 
This legislative short-coming was highlighted in the recent unreported High Court 
matter, which further served to illustrate situations where the bright-lined tests are not 
applicable to a scenario of joint de jure control, however one party also had de facto 
control and therefore a greater capacity to ‘materially influence’ the policy of the 
business. 107  The court rightly established this to be the enquiry for examination, 
concluding it to be a factual enquiry based on the circumstances of the case. The court 
further addressed whether purely factual control is sufficient for there to be an 
‘ability’ to materially influence the policy of the business within the context of 
competition law, making reference to the Caxton case, where it was submitted by the 
court with regards to the meaning of ‘ability’, that it implies a power derived through 
agreement or a similar legal instrument, and cannot be said to be established through 
how a company is managed, nor whether parties elect to exercise these rights. This 
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case further highlights that better regard be paid to the catch-all set out in section 2(d) 
in order to best determine whether control has been established. It is submitted the 
courts accordingly need apply their minds to the context rather than mechanically 
following a checklist set out by the bright-lined provisions.108 
 
Section 2(2)(b) contemplates control situations arising from Close Corporations and 
can be viewed as very similar to the provisions set out in section 12(2)(f), in as much 
that control is determined according to the majority of the voting power. 
 
Section 2(2)(c) deal with trust situations control being based on voting power, the 
ability to appoint trustees, as well as on the ability to appoint or change the 
beneficiaries to the trust. This provision can similarly be found in section 12(2)(e) of 
the Competition Act.  
 
Section 2(2)(d) is significant in that it mirrors the default provision found in section 
12(2)(g) of the Competition Act. Stating person controls a juristic person when that 
person has the ability to materially influence the policy of that juristic person in a 
manner comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, would be able 
to exercise an element of control referred to in paragraphs (a),(b), and (c). 
 
Section 2(3) makes allowance for persons detailed in section 2(1) to rebut the 
presumption of relation with the necessary evidence.  
 
It is submitted in agreement with Delport that section 2 is an exhaustive list modeled 
off the Competition Act’s section 12,109 indicating that both pieces of legislation are 
overly constrictive and that not enough regard is paid to section 12(2)(g) and its sister 
provision identically twinned in section 2(d) of the Companies Act by the respective 
courts in both competition and companies law. He goes on to observe that while 
control centers around the majority of votes on a board, reference is only made to 
appointment and election, or the power to control that conduct, but falls silent and 
fails to set out the powers dealing with removal, assuming it to be through approval 
by special resolution. Section 2(d) is however meant to expanse beyond the confines 
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of ordinary corporate law principles based on voting control, in accordance rather 
with what the circumstances may dictate on a case-by-case basis.110 
 
3.3.2 Section 3: Subsidiary Relationships 
 
‘(1) A company is— 
(a) a subsidiary of another juristic person if that juristic person, one or more other 
subsidiaries of that juristic person, or one or more nominees of that juristic person or 
any of its subsidiaries, alone or in any combination—  
(i) is or are directly or indirectly able to exercise, or control the exercise of, a majority 
of the general voting rights associated with issued securities of that company, whether 
pursuant to a shareholder agreement or otherwise; or 
(ii) has or have the right to appoint or elect, or control the appointment or election of, 
directors of that company who control a majority of the votes at a meeting of the board; 
or 
    (b) a wholly-owned subsidiary of another juristic person if all of the general voting 
rights associated with issued securities of the company are held or controlled, alone or 
in any combination, by persons contemplated in paragraph (a). 
(2) For the purpose of determining whether a person controls all or a majority of the general 
voting rights associated with issued securities of a company— 
(a) voting rights that are exercisable only in certain circumstances are to be taken into 
account only— 
 (i) when those circumstances have arisen, and for so long as they continue; or 
(ii) when those circumstances are under the control of the person holding the 
voting rights; 
(b) voting rights that are exercisable only on the instructions or with the consent or 
concurrence of another person are to be treated as being held by a nominee for that 
other person; and 
(c) voting rights held by—  
       (i) a person as nominee for another person are to be treated as held by that 
                other person; or  
  (ii) a person in a fiduciary capacity are to be treated as held by the beneficiary 
 of those voting rights.  
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), ‘hold’, or any derivative of it, refers to the 
registered or direct or indirect beneficial holder of securities conferring a right to vote.’ 
 
Section 3 dealing with subsidiary relationships, is assumed to be interpreted in line 
with the provisions set out in the old Act under section 1(3)(a) with regards to 
subsidiaries in the context of defining control. Michael Katz includes the provision in 
his analysis on comparing the two Acts in order to define control. Delport submits 
that again, the circumstances set out in the provision dealing with subsidiaries is 
exhaustive.111 
 
                                                        
110 Op cit note 33 at 8-22 – 24.  
111 See Unisec Group Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1986 (3) SA 259 (T). 
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The new section, although worded differently, in substance it has the same meaning, 
although no specific reference is give to one replacing the other. The only material 
difference being in respect of holding companies, in as much that the new section 
relaxes the requirement for membership or registered shareholding of their 
subsidiaries.112  
 
However the provision does not set out a definition for the term holding company, 
only the term ‘hold’ is made reference to in the context of section 3(3). 
Notwithstanding, this provision is confusing with regards to beneficial (direct and 
indirect) holders of shares to which voting rights attach. It is submitted that section 
12(2)(d) of the Companies Act offers no solution to this legislative oversight as it 
simply makes reference to the old Act’s section 1(3)(a).  
 
It is clear that while there are numerous overlaps with the competition provisions, the 
Companies Act is also somewhat problematic in regards to defining holding and 
subsidiary relationships, and thus may fall foul of being overly narrow and 
constrictive. 
 
Section 3(1)(a)(i) is similar to section 12(2)(b) with regards to defining a company in 
terms of voting rights. Bright lining however creates a risk of being constructed in a 
disproportionately narrow sense by the courts. 
 
Section 3(1)(a)(ii) is similarly comparable to section 12(2)(c) in respect of electing 
directors. The former being phrased in more specific language, as the Competition 
Act only makes reference to the appointment of the majority of directors, while 
conversely the Companies Act refers to the appointment of directors who hold the 
majority of voting rights at meetings of the board. It is submitted that the Companies 
Act offers a sounder and more logical explanation, as the majority of the directors 
may not hold the majority of the voting rights.113 
 
Section 3(2) sets out when a person will hold the majority of voting rights, and is also 
comparable with and encompassed by section 12(2)(b). However, the term ‘controlled 
                                                        
112  Op cit note 33 at 8-24. 
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entity’ is wider and less technical concept than that of a subsidiary. In this sense the 
Competition Act is preferred as it is less constrictive and may therefore leave room 
open for this to be interpreted to include other corporate bodies in addition to 
companies. The Companies Act only defines beneficial interest (assumed to mean 
beneficial owner in the common law sense) and not beneficial holder, however the 
beneficial holder of securities and a holder of a beneficial interest do not equate to the 
same thing.114 
 
 Furthermore Delport opines that while the reference to holding voting rights in a 
‘fiduciary capacity’ or as a ‘nominee’ was intended by the legislature to prevent these 
types of representatives evading the provision in order to abuse the corporate 
personality of the undertaking, using it as an alter ego to escape the consequences of 
potentially unconscionable conduct.  
 
3.3.3 Section 123: Mandatory Offers 
 
‘(1) In this section, ‘‘prescribed percentage’’ means the percentage prescribed by the 
Minister in terms of subsection (5). 
 (2) This section applies if—  
 (a) either—  
(i) a regulated company reacquires any of its voting securities as contemplated in 
section 48; or in terms of a scheme of arrangement contemplated in section 114; 
or 
(ii) a person acting alone has, or two or more related or inter-related   persons, or 
two or more persons acting in concert, have, acquired a beneficial interest in any 
voting securities issued by a regulated company;  
(b) before that acquisition a person was, or persons contemplated in paragraph (a)(ii) 
together were, able to exercise less than the prescribed percentage of all the voting 
rights attached to securities of that company; and 
(c) as a result of that acquisition, together with any other securities of the company 
already held by the person or persons contemplated in paragraph (a)(ii), they are able to 
exercise at least the prescribed percentage of all the voting rights attached to securities 
of that company. 
(3) Within one day after the date of a completed acquisition contemplated in subsection (2), 
                                                        
114 Op cit 101 at 32. 
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the person or persons in whom the prescribed percentage, or more, of the voting securities 
beneficially vests must give notice in the prescribed manner to the holders of the remaining 
securities, including in that notice— 
(a) a statement that they are in a position to exercise at least the prescribed percentage 
of all the voting rights attached to securities of that regulated 10 company; and 
(b) offering to acquire any remaining such securities on terms determined in 
accordance with this Act and the Takeover Regulations. 
(4) Within one month after giving notice in terms of subsection (3), the person or persons 
contemplated in subsection (2) must deliver a written offer, in compliance with the Takeover 
Regulations, to the holders of the remaining securities of that company, to acquire those 
securities on the terms contemplated in subsection (3)(b). 
(5) For the purposes contemplated in this section, the Minister, on the advice of the Panel, 
may prescribe a percentage of not more than 35% of the voting securities of a company.’  
 
Section 123 of chapter 5, setting out fundamental transactions, and deals with 
mandatory offers. In such a context, the section stipulates that the holder of 35 per 
cent of the voting securities,115 must give notice to other holders informing them of 
the holders right to exercise voting power, and its obligation to make offers for the 
acquisition of the remaining securities, in a manner that is in accordance with the Act 
and the Take Over Regulations referred to in section 120 of chapter 5.  
 
As this is an example of the exercise of control, it is submitted that it may in fact 
prejudice and unfairly exclude minority shareholder’s rights to vote, as well as other 
forms of consequent inclusion, effectively barring their means of participation. It is 
further submitted that while the purported objective of the section is to treat all 
shareholders fairly and equally,116 there may be instances where majority shareholders 
collude to the minority’s detriment.  
 
                                                        
115 The 35 per cent threshold is determined by the Minister in accordance with Regulation 86(1). This 
is not relevant to competition law. Rather, s12(2)(a) setting out 50 per cent or more of issued share 
capital is regarded as determinative of establishing control in the context of quantifying percentages as 
qualifying factors in providing a definition for control.  
116 Farouk Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 736. 
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Yet in Gold Fields, Lewis P held in obiter that hostile mergers or take-overs were 
necessary in facilitating the competition process, however, that the Competition Act 
seeks to ‘chill’ these forms of bids in particular sectors.117 
 
3.4 Findings of the research 
 
In embarking upon a comparison between two pieces of legislation and the various 
definitions of control offered by the Competition Act and the Companies Act 
respectively, as set out above, the following was observed and noted by the 
participants,118 as experts in these fields. I will list the responses collected from the 
participants in the order that the sample was received, and accordingly data was 
gathered. In answering the questions, ‘is there a gap between the Competition Act 
definition of control and the companies law definition of control?’ and ‘are either or 
both areas lacking in definition?’119  
 
Davis JP submitted,  [t]here is a significant provision, s[ection] 2 of the Companies 
Act. However in competition law, the courts decide the question,’ and for the second 
question stated, ‘[y]es, in competition law.’120 
 
Adv. le Roux omitted the first question, and opined on the second that ‘[t]he point is 
not that there is a lack of definition, it’s that the two Acts are aiming at different 
concepts of control.  The Co[mpanies] Act reflects the policy to regulate control so as 
to prevent its abuse with respect to governance/shareholders – protecting minorities 
and subsidiaries, as well as to trigger the reporting requirements in corporate 
groups. 
 
The Comp[etition] Act is concerned about changes in control that would alter market 
power/structure/conditions of competition – such as by increasing the likelihood of 
coordination or concentrations that could produce dominant positions that may be 
abused. So it is a wider, more flexible definition, without hard/bright lines like the 
35% deemed control provision in Co law. 
                                                        
117 Supra note 91. 
118 See answers to question 2 of the research questionnaire. 
119 Op cit note 14. 
120 Op cit note 15. 
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The need to understand Co[mpany] law concepts of votes/rights and relationships 
(e.g. concert parties) applies in Comp[etition] law of course, but the need for 
certainty that the former requires for corporate governance could be a hindrance in 
competition/merger control circumstances.  A party may be able to impact the market 
and therefore competition without falling into one of the definitions of controller for 
Co[mpany] law purposes.  Its identity and conduct may be relevant for merger 
control though. 
 
There are many Co[mpany] law scenarios and questions, though, that comp[etition] 
law ignores as a result.  E.g. issues around meaning of “beneficially owns” “majority 
of shares”, how to account for vote allocation arrangements or shareholder 
agreements on voting (voting pools, for e.g.). 
 
But, frankly, the Caxton decision and the meaning of sec 12(2)(g) in particular, 
provide sufficient guidance for merger control purposes.’121 
 
Michael Katz asserted, in relation to the difference between concepts of control in the 
Companies Act and Competition Act, ‘The question as to whether there is any 
alignment in the concepts of “control” in the Companies Act raises interesting issues. 
It is vital not to consider the concept of “control” in a vacuum in both the Companies 
Act and the Competition Act but rather to examine control in a particular context. 
Thus, for example, “control” in company law is relevant in the definition of holding 
and subsidiary companies (Section 3 of the Companies Act), the prohibition of 
providing financial assistance to acquire securities (Section 44 of the Companies Act) 
and the prohibition of intra-group finance (Section 45 of the Companies Act). 
 
For your purposes the question of “control” arises in the context of merger control. 
In this context control for Competition Act purposes as set out in Section 12(2) of the 
Competition Act : there are certain bright line tests - Section 12(2)(a),(b), (c); and the 
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overriding omnibus test in Section 12(2)(g) which rests on the ability to “materially 
influence the policy of the juristic person in a manner comparable …” 
 
Control for Companies Act purposes is relevant in the obligation set out in Section 
123 of the Companies Act to make a mandatory offer where a party acquires at least 
35% of the voting securities of a company . The threshold of 35% is deemed control. 
The important question is whose securities must be aggregated to determine whether 
the 35% threshold has been crossed? In this regard the securities held by the 
following parties must be aggregated : the acquiring party; related parties and inter-
related parties of the acquiring party; and persons acting in concert with the 
acquiring party. 
 
It will be seen from the aforegoing that in merger control, the Competition Act 
definition is wider in that Section 12(2)(g) has a potentially broad sweep. 
 
The Companies Act, although it does not have the breadth of Section 12(2)(g) (save in 
the case of Close Corporations), is potentially wider in that it includes the three 
categories of persons referred to [in the aforementioned] paragraphs … above. 
 
As regards merger control for company law purposes, the 35% threshold is 
conclusive. 
 
The only issue that arises is whether there are concert parties whose shares may be 
taken in account. This is a factual enquiry to be answered in each case. 
 
For competition law purposes, the 35% threshold is not relevant. 
 
In an acquisition of securities of more than 35% or less than 35%, control may be 
achieved dependent on the application of the principles set out in Section 12(2)(g) to 
the shareholder profile of the company concerned. Thus, in a company where there is 
a large number of shareholders with relatively small shareholdings, control may be 
achieved with less than 35%. Conversely, in a company with a smaller number of 
large shareholders, control may only be achieved with more than 35%. 
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There are sometimes debates in the competition law space relating to the relevance of 
shares held by related and concert parties. 
 
Thus, you will see that the concepts of control in company law and competition law 
are based on different philosophical and policy considerations. The tests for 




The ENS competition department commenting in support submitted, ‘I don't believe 
so. Apart from the fact that part of the Companies Act definition of "control" derives 
from the Competition Act, I regard them as discreet pieces of legislation - each 
subject to its own case law, jurisprudence and policy drivers. Of course, the 
jurisprudence may overlap, from time to time, but the essential approach to each 
section must be informed by the broader statutory context in which it exists.  
 
With this in mind, the Competition Act serves a fundamentally different purpose to the 
Companies Act (in general); and the "control" provisions in each serve fundamentally 
different purposes (in particular).’ 
 
‘In commenting on the definition of "control" in the Competition Act only, 1 do not 
believe that it is lacking in definition. If anything, it is too complicated, in my view, 
and could be reduced substantially. Given the nuances applicable to "control" from a 
competition law perspective, my preference is for a simply worded, broad definition 
that is given meaning, over time, in case law, policy documents and guidelines.123 
 
Norman Manoim responded, ‘I don’t think of this as a gap.  
 
The notion of control serves different purposes under the respective Acts and hence 
we shouldn’t expect the definitions of control to be the same. In competition law a 
change of control can mean a change in the behavior of the firm in the market, which 
may have implications for competition, and hence its concept of control is wider than 
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that in company law. For Competition law a change in de facto control is as 
important, if not more important than a change in de jure control.’124 
 
3.5 Analysis and Recommendations  
 
It has become evident through this study, that both concepts of a merger, and that of 
control as defined by section 12, have been formulated in a confusing manner, 
consequently making the provisions difficult to interpret in certain cases.  This is clear 
from the inconsistency displayed by the courts’ application of the section. In the 
Distillers case, the CAC opined on the purpose of chapter 3 being to carefully monitor 
transactions that may substantially lessen competition.125 Davis JP further remarked 
that it is also aimed at promoting competition in certain market structures.126  
 
The Tribunal however offered a better interpretation in the preceding decision on the 
matter. In as much that it was constructed in a wider manner, and held ‘the legislature 
intended to raise the burden of notification to avoid undesirable consequences on all 
involved of having to unravel transactions afterwards’.  Thus it is has been observed 
that the obligation to notify must be construed broadly, and in summary, section 12(2) 
is not determinative in establishing the meaning of the word control.  
 
Other cases however have illustrated a more restrictive view, further attesting to the 
erratic interpretation and application of section 12. The interpretation of the merger 
provisions shown in the Johnnic case differs from that in Cape Empowerment Trust, 
to the extent that authors Kemp and Sutherland have noted that this ‘seems illogical’.   
 
While the bright-lined provisions set out in section 12(2)(a) – (c) need not necessarily 
be jettisoned entirely, they have lead to uncertainty, accordingly it is recommended 
that the wider reaching more general provision set out in section 12(2)(g) be used as a 
guide to follow, the language of ‘material influence’ being adequate and in line with 
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article 3(2) of the EC Merger Regulations, setting out a person obtains control where 
the ‘possibility of exercising decisive influence’ over a firm is conferred over them.127 
The default provision is sufficiently general enough to widen or narrow the scope of 
the section on an individual case-by-case basis according to policy grounds, if it is 
interpreted correctly by the courts, who have not done so, as is evident from the case 
law. This it is submitted that the legislature would have been correct in providing for 
an explicit definition of control in relation to defining a merger as set out in section 
12(1). However, in the current absence, section 12(g) can be applied to ease the 
definitional complications surrounding control.  
 
With regards to joint control, as the Act fails to define it at all, a blend of descriptions 
from the Sasol case,128 as well as Issue 3 of the Practitioner’s Update,129  can be 
consulted for some clarity. In addition to the European approach, setting out that joint 
control is established where it can be shown that functions are being performed 
normally, executed by firms operating on the market.130 It is submitted this is a sound 
requirement and should be implemented into South African competition law. 
 
Although the Companies Act sets out a more comprehensive list codified under the 
various provisions aforementioned, most notably sections 2, 3, 113, 115, 116, and 
123, and can thus be argued to provide a greater specification of instances where 
control may be established, however these provisions are still not without fault and 
problems of their own, therefore potentially leaving open a gap for situations where 
control has passed in a manner not listed. This might result in companies either 
actively exploiting this gap in order to avoid notification for reasons that will be 
explored under the section, chapter 4.  
 
Or, where bona fide errors have been made as the result of ignorance on behalf of the 
parties to the transaction being unaware of the consequences that will flow from 
                                                        
127 Reg 139/2004.   
128 Sasol Chemical Industries (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission 45/CR/May06 2008/06/02. 
129 Competition Commission South Africa Issue 3: Practitioner’s Update The application of merger 
provisions of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, as amended, to joint ventures (2001). 
130 Richard Whish Competition Law 4ed (2001) 749. 
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control passing in a manner constituting a merger of a certain size, as set out in 
chapter 5 below.  
 
This accordingly could lead to sever time and cost implications that could 
disadvantage the business of the undertakings in question, and may later led to a 
greater ripple effect throughout the market of that particular sector.  
 
Furthermore issues may arise with regards to beneficial ownership versus beneficial 
interests,131 as section 12(2)(a) only sets out and deals with the term ‘owns’, this is 
problematic. Section 56(3) of the Companies Act at least set out requirements for 
listed companies to keep registers regarding beneficial ownership. Again, this might 
be of use in a competition law context, and something the authorities ought to 
consider including into the South African competition law regime.  
 
The Ethos and Cape Empowerment Trust cases act as good examples that the meaning 
of beneficial holding of shares is unclear. It was held that the holder of the majority of 
preference shares is the sole controller of that particular undertaking to which the 
preference shares attach. Despite the fact that in practice, preference shares seldom 
have voting rights that attach to them.132 It is thus opined herein that these cases serve 
to illustrate that while section 2(d) of the Companies Act mirrors section 12(2)(g) of 
the Competition Act, it needs to be interpreted in a similar manner giving it the 
relevant breadth that its application requires, in order to best align its jurisprudence 
with an appreciation of completion law. Notwithstanding that the provisions of the 
Companies Act may reciprocally be consulted where sections 12(2)(a)-(f) are 
unhelpful in order to avoid overly formalistic constructions of the law, as have 
already been seen in the courts interpretation of the legislation thus far.  
 
While the two different pieces of legislation serve different philosophical and policy 
functions within the commercial sphere, it is herein opined that a reason cannot be 
found as to why the provisions in both the respective statutes cannot be turn to and 
made use of where it would be beneficial in terms of the need to establish control, as 
well as to reach a fair and favourable outcome. Thus while different in purpose and 
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function, they should be viewed as separate but complimentary pieces of legislation, 
until such time as a more adequate singular and uniform definition of control can be 
legislated, as neither is without its flaws. 
 
It is therefore submitted that these legislative problems need to be cured in order to 
facilitate consistency and a balanced reading of the provisions governing merger 
control for a more stable outcome. It is recommended that a solution may be to relax 
the provision aimed at defining control to give it a wider effect, in line with Canadian, 
European and Kenyan merger control, all of which offer much wider definitions.   
 
The manner in which the Canadian Competition Bureau governs merger control is set 
out in two parts according to the regulatory framework. Part VIII of the Act sets out 
substantive merger review, the provisions of which apply to all mergers (the term is 
correctly defined very broadly), not just those caught for notification based on size, 
but rather those that have a adequate Canadian nexus (in other words, a real and 
significant connection to Canada), and therefore subject to potential investigation and 
evaluation by the Commissioner and possible referral to the Tribunal. Conversely, the 
Act’s pre-merger notification regime is more limited in its ambit. Part IX of the Act 
creates five broad categories of transactions that are subject to pre-merger notification 
if they meet certain party and transaction size thresholds. These include, asset 
acquisitions, share acquisitions, acquisitions of an interest in an unincorporated 
combination, amalgamations, and the formation of unincorporated combinations. 
 
The Act does also contain a bright-lined definition of ‘control’, in as much that it 
provides for, the holding or acquisition of more than 50 per cent of the voting 
securities of the corporation or, in the case of a partnership, the holding or acquisition 
of an interest in the partnership entitling the holder or acquirer to more than 50 per 
cent of the profits of the partnership or of its assets on dissolution. However, the Act’s 
pre-merger notification regime does not require that control be acquired to trigger a 
filing obligation. The acquisition of ‘any of the assets in Canada of an operating 
business’ (other than in the ordinary course), or of shares yielding cumulative 
ownership of more than twenty per cent of the shares of a public company (more than 
50 per cent if the acquirer already owned twenty per cent or more before the proposed 
transaction) or more than 35 per cent of the shares of a private company (more than 
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50 per cent if 35 per cent or more was owned before the proposed transaction), will be 
sufficient to trigger a notification obligation (provided that other financial criteria are 
met). There are similar types of thresholds respecting acquisitions of interests in 
combinations. 
Additionally minority interests less than outright control may be caught by the 
substantive provisions of the Act, as the provision defines a merger to include any 
transaction by which a party acquires a ‘significant interest’ in the business of another 
person. What constitutes a ‘significant interest’ is not defined by the Act. However, 
the Commissioner’s Merger Enforcement Guidelines contemplate that the acquisition 
of a ‘significant interest’ could occur at as low as a ten per cent ownership interest, or 
in some cases without an equity interest if contractual or other circumstances allow 
material influence to be exercised over the business of another person. It is submitted 
that a significant interest has a broader sweep than that of a material influence, and is 
thus a better-worded provision to follow in respect of defining control.  
Control of mergers is set out in part IV of the Kenyan Act providing, ‘[a] person  
“controls” an undertaking under the Act if that person-  
(a) beneficially owns more than half of the issued share capital or business or assets 
of the undertaking; 
(b) is entitled to a majority of the votes that may be cast at a general meeting of the 
undertaking, or has the ability to control the voting of a majority of those votes, 
either directly or through a controlled entity of that undertaking; 
(c) is able to appoint, or to veto the appointment, of a majority of the directors of the 
undertaking; 
(d) is a holding company, and the undertaking is a subsidiary of that company as 
contemplated in the Companies Act; 
(e) in the case of the undertaking being a trust, has the ability to control the majority 
of the votes of the trustees or to appoint the majority of the trustees or to appoint 
or change the majority of the beneficiaries of the trust; 
(f) in the case of the undertaking being a nominee undertaking, owns the majority of 
the members’ interest or controls directly or has the right to control the majority 
of members’ votes in the nominee undertaking; or 
(g) has the ability to materially influence the policy of the undertaking in a manner 
comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, can exercise an 
element of control referred to in the points above.’133 
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Minority and other interests are captured in the last point above provided that such 
person exercises ‘control’ as contemplated above. The Consolidated Guidelines, 
however, indicate that the Authority will not ordinarily view an acquisition of a 
minority interest below twenty per cent of the voting securities of an undertaking held 
only for the purpose of passive investment without exercising influence over the 
affairs of the undertaking as an exercise of ‘control’.  
It is evident from an examination of the Kenyan Act that the provisions are similar to 
those set out in the Competition Act, as well as those provided for by the Companies 
Act, this suffusion incorporates an enhanced characterisation of instances where 
control may be established, offering a clearer framework for the courts to employ in 
determining whether a merger of a certain size has occurred. As it has been opined 
above and below, when constructing the issue of control, it is recommended that 
reading from provisions set out in both Acts could be helpful. The Kenyan legislation 
conveniently negates this need by concisely including the relevant elements from the 
Companies Act into the provisions of the Competition Act, as well as polishing out a 
number of flaws. This is a good example for African anti-trust, accordingly it is thus 
submitted that South Africa should follow a similar model incorporating both spheres 
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CHAPTER FOUR: NOTIFICATION AND FAILURE TO COMPLY 
 
4.1 Introduction and history 
 
Gun jumping can be broadly defined within the scope of premerger unlawful 
coordination between the parties to a merger transaction, namely and most commonly 
at a procedural level, where mandatory premerger notification and the requisite 
clearance after the stipulated waiting period has not been adhered to despite the 
relevant thresholds having been met. For example where an acquiring firm exercises 
control over the target firm prior to or without first receiving clearance from the 
Commission or Tribunal where applicable. Gun jumping may further occur in a 
substantive manner, where prior to the transaction, the parties thereto coordinate their 
competitive conduct. 
 
Historically, unnotified transactions have long since been a concern in foreign 
jurisdictions namely in the US, as provided for by section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
section 7A of the Clayton Act, and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements 
Act of 1976, under which firms may incur penalties as high as $16000 per day for the 
period of noncompliance. These American antitrust provisions may result in either 
civil or criminal sanctions where a firm has been found in violation thereof, therefor 
the transaction could be considerably hindered. The EU Commission and its member 
States authorities have similarly followed suit with similar governing legislation on 
the matter.  
 
As has South Africa in terms of the regulations set out in the Act. Consequently, firms 
intending to merge need to be cognisant of these developments where negotiating and 
initiating new transactions and should be mindful not to be found in violation. This 
was however not always so under the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition 
Act, which was devoid of statutory provisions setting out mandatory pre-notification 
of mergers, accordingly merger control relied on voluntary notification. Therefore the 
current Act in place is somewhat state of the art comparatively, detailing thresholds 
setting out different types of mergers and whether they require compulsory pre-
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notification and clearance for approval of the transaction, showing much needed 
legislative reform.134 
 
4.2 Legislated merger thresholds and their effect on notification compliance 
 
Mergers caught for notification are dependent on a threshold set out in section 11 
(5)(a),(b), and (c) of the Act, further categorising mergers by size. These categories of 
mergers defined by the Act in section 13, detailing small mergers, and section 13A 
setting out notification and implementation of other mergers, on an intermediate or 
large scale. 
 
Section 11 (1)(a) provides that it is for the Minister (in liaison with the Competition 
Commission) to determine these thresholds on both lower and higher ends of the 
spectrum. Such determinations are to be made based on the assessment of “combined 
annual turnover or assets, or a lower and higher threshold of combinations of turnover 
or assets…”  
 
Accordingly, a small merger is defined where assets and or turnover amounts to less 
than R560 Million of the acquiring companies and the target firm, over the last 
financial year, or where the target firms assets and or turnover from the last financial 
year is less than R80 Million. Intermediate mergers on the other hand, occur when the 
assets and turnover of the acquiring companies and the target firm sum to at least 
R560 Million, but no more than R6.6 Billion, over the last financial year. As well as 
where the target firms assets and turnover of the last financial year amount to between 
R80 Million and R190 Million. Finally, a large merger takes place where the assets 
and turnover of the acquiring group of companies and the target firm amounts to R6.6 
Billion over the last financial year, in addition to when the assets and turnover of the 
target firm is at least R190 Million within the last financial year. 
 
However, while these legislated definitional thresholds exist, not all mergers actually 
resemble one as per these definitions for competition law purposes, as the terms is 
usually seen through a commercial lens and therefore understood in such a context. 
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As such, other like transactions for example amalgamations, acquisitions, and 
divestments should all be carefully scrutinized, and further, in order to avoid 
inadvertently missing filing and thus incurring costly penalties. It is thus advisable to 
seek out the legal counsel of a competition expert in instances where uncertainty may 
arise, as it is evident that the Competition Authorities are adapting a no tolerance 
stance with regards to failure to notify a notifiable merger. 
 
This position was made clear in the recent matter regarding a large merger between 
Life Healthcare Group Pty Ltd and Joint Medical Holdings Ltd,135 where a record 
fine was imposed on the merging parties. On 7 April 2016, the two hospital groups 
entered into an agreement with the competition commission, admitting failure to 
notify, and further acquiescing to penalty payment.  
The hospital moguls were found in contravention of section 11 of the Act, for failure 
to notify a large merger, where the threshold was met.  The merger was implemented 
without the approval of the Competition Tribunal and was therefore in contravention 
of chapter 3 of the Act.  
 
Prior to this offence in 2004, the respondents were found to be operating hospitals 
within Southern Africa in contravention of section 4 of the Act, and admitted to 
partaking in the prohibited practice of price-fixing.  
 
In reaching final settlement, the Competition Commission dropped the former and 
more egregious complaint, in exchange the parties entered into a consent agreement to 
facilitate the process (adhering to the principles of the Corporate Leniency Policy).136 
This agreement set out the parties’ admission of guild with regards to entering into 
and implementing a large merger without the approval of the competition authorities. 
LHG further disinvested from JMH. 
 
However, despite the commissions’ leniency in terms of the section 4 offence, it was 
made clear (from the hefty penalty imposed for failure to notify) that entities 
conducting themselves in contravention of the Act will be dealt with harshly, slapping 
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the respondents with a R10 Million fine. A consequence more severe than any prior 
penalty imposed for implementing a merger without competition commission 
approval. The highest to date preceding the hospital case paling in comparison, at a 
meager R1mil fine for gun jumping activities under the South African Act.  
 
More recently, in 2017, Caxton again attempted to snub Naspers actions by applying 
to intervene in its rivals settlement agreement with the Competition Commission, in 
order to increase the proposed R1 Million fine for failure to notify to R40 Million, 
stating the settled amount to be ‘shockingly inappropriate’,137 however, the Tribunal 
rejected Caxton’s application for leave to intervene in the merger hearing. This rivalry 
has been noted (on Caxton’s part) as ‘borderline obsessive’ by Lewis.138 
 
Conversely when dealing with small mergers, they generally do not require 
compulsory notification, and there are no filling fees payable. The commission may 
however still calls for its notification within 6 months of implementation if the merger 
is seen to potentially substantially lessen competition. The commission issued 
guidelines on the notification of small mergers, that have been effective since April 
2009, more specifically, the commission requires a small merger to be notified where 
at the time of entering into the transaction any of the firms, or firms within the group, 
are respondents to pending proceedings referred by the commission to the tribunal, or 
are subject to an investigation in terms of Chapter 2 of the Act. In addition the 
commission must further assess whether the merger can or cannot be justified on 
public interest grounds.139 
 
The commission is empowered with the jurisdiction to decide on notified small and 
intermediate mergers, however with regards to large mergers, it is for the competition 
tribunal to give their final decision. Similarly, the commission is empowered to 
approve any small or intermediate merger that has been filed (with or without 
conditions), or to prohibit it entirely. However with regards to large mergers it is 
again for the tribunal to decide, as the commission is only empowered to make 
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recommendations thereto.140 The parties to the merger, as well as intervening parties 
to the merger proceedings are not prohibited from appealing these decisions made by 
the commission or tribunal to approve or prohibit a merger on the relevant grounds.  
 
In further classifying notified mergers for the purpose of operational efficiency, the 
commission differentiates between levels of complexity with regards to competition 
or public interest concerns. 
 
Categorisation has three further phases ranging from phase 1 being non-complex, 
phase 2 being of a complex nature, and phase 3 being very complex. Additionally, the 
commission has further published merger investigation service standards, most 
notably in reference to time constraints imposed on the investigation. These service 
standards are necessitated by the stringent time frames provided for by the Act, 
setting out the time period of investigation based on the size of the merger, such that 
small and intermediate mergers must be reviewed within 20 business days, however 
the commission has the power to extend this to a maximum of 40 business days.141 
Large mergers on the other hand need to be reviewed within 40 business days, and 
only upon the granting of an application submitted by the commission to the tribunal, 
requesting such extension, may the investigative process be delayed, and only by 15 
business days at a time.142  
 
4.3 Potential reasons for failure to notify: findings from the study 
 
Davis JP. and Adv. le Roux are both of the opinion that the most commonly noted 
reason leading to failure to notify is based on disagreement as to whether control has 
passed from one entity to another.143  
 
The ENS department elaborates on this in somewhat more detail, commenting ‘In my 
experience, missed merger notifications tend to fall into one of the following 
categories: 
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a. Bona fide errors, where the missed merger is occasioned by ignorance of the 
obligation; mistaken interpretation of the applicable law; or mistaken application of 
the applicable facts. 
b. Deliberate decisions to ignore merger notification obligations owing to the 
commercial exigencies of the transaction (usually time related). 
c. Deliberate decisions to ignore merger notification obligations owing to an 
apprehension that the transaction will ultimately be prohibited or subject to onerous 
conditions.’144 
 
Maniom in answering stated, ‘There are firms who have failed to notify a merger and 
when this has been uncovered, have used as a fact in mitigation that because the 
change in control did not amount to a change in control in company law i.e. they did 
not own more than 50% plus one of the shares or they didn’t have control over the 
board, that they did not know this was a notifiable change of control in competition 
law. [Further, see] answer under 4. [There are reasons that firms seek to evade 
notifying a merger but this is not influenced by the gap between company law and 
competition law. Because a firm may not implement a notifiable merger without prior 
clearance from the competition authorities which may take some time to come 
through, firms may seek to evade notification for strategic reasons. For instance there 
may be rival bidders for the same firm (See Bidvest Adcock) or a hostile takeover 
(Harmony Goldfields)].  In other instance firms may not know they have to notify 
because a change of de facto control as opposed to de jure control is often opaque or 
uncertain. For instance under section 12(2)(g) de facto control is very widely defined 
and unsurprisingly there are instances where firms did not consider that control had 
changed but others considered it had. (see the Caxton v SABC and Multichoice cases 
both Tribunal and CAC decisions.)’ 
 
Adv. le Roux finds no definitional shortcomings in either Act’s provisions with regard 
to defining control.145 It is posited that these two submissions are in conflict with one 
another, as, if either or both definitions were adequate, then surely the most noted 
reason by the participants for failure to notify would not center around the issue of 
control. Perhaps the findings read too much into the data (which are sparse), but 
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nevertheless concludes that if the definitional understanding of what constitutes 
control is unclear enough for the regular occurrence of failure to notify mergers, then 
is there not a need for reforming these legislated definitions in order to paint a clearer 
picture for firms who may incur massive penalties and delays in concluding the 
transaction and getting the deal through. 
 
Adv. le Roux further submitted in answer to question 7 of the research questionnaire, 
as to whether failure to notify is ever an indication of or precursor to anticompetitive 
behaviours, “Not in my experience, haven’t seen a correlation between notification 
failures and prohibited practices [.]”146  
 
Yet the recent hospital case, is (herein opined) a shining example of such a situation, 
where a consent order was agreed to in exchange for leniency with regards to price 
fixing which we know to be anticompetitive conduct. Thus while a generally unlikely 
reason for failure to notify, it is notwithstanding a seeming obvious one, as firms 
would attempt to avoid scrutiny from the competition authorities in the event that the 
transaction would be prohibited or subject to undesirable conditions for approval.  
 
Davis JP on the other hand has observed failure to notify being a precursor to 
anticompetitive conduct, citing the latest SABC case. 147  In which yet again, a 
complaint was brought by Caxton, against SABC and Multichoice,148 claiming that the 
parties had concluded a merger, which they failed to notify. The issue for 
determination being whether an agreement between the parties gave rise to a 
notifiable merger in terms of section 12(1), section 13A(1) and section 13A(3), 
section 14(1)(b), section 16(2), and section 17.  
 
The Tribunal found no merger had taken place, despite Caxton’s allegations of foul 
play. First of all that the agreement gave Multichoice exclusive license over certain 
SABC content to broadcast on an entertainment channel on DStv, secondly there was 
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a concern that SABC would broadcast its channels on an unencrypted basis without 
any conditional access system.149 
 
The ENS department commented similarly, submitting ‘It could be. The category of 
missed merger in (c) above may be indicative of underlying anti-competitive 
behaviour.’150 
 
Conversely Maniom answered, ‘Strangely enough this is seldom the reason. Most are 
driven by the need to get a merger through quickly for the reasons I explained earlier. 
I can think of only two cases where there was probably and anticompetitive motive 
both involving health care mergers. One involving Netcare as the acquiring firm and 
the other Life Health care...’151 
 
There are other examples in our case law thus far that suggests many further reasons 
for failure to notify, namely, where banks or investment funds who are only briefly 
shareholders in regular and various deals, and thus accordingly might not view 
themselves as controlling shareholders despite passing legally determinative 
thresholds.  
 
In the Standard Bank matter, 152  the tribunal imposed a fine summing to R 350 
thousand for the failure to notify a transaction and was therefore found in 
contravention of section 13A(1) & (3). Despite a finding by the Tribunal that it was 
unlikely to substantially lessen competition, or cause any loss or damage to the 
markets concerned, nor did it raise any public interest issues. Accordingly, the penalty 
was set at a base level equivalent to the applicable filing fee, as the sole aggravating 
factor in the matter was weighed against the three mitigating factors mentioned.  
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Another reason may be that parties needing to get a transaction through swiftly for 
strategic purposes will attempt to avoid notification due to the delays it may cause in 
concluding the deal. For example where a target firm is hostile, or there are 
competitive bids at play.  
 
Conversely, opponents to the transaction often rival bidders or competitors to the 
acquiring firm may interdict the implementation of the merger based on its non-
notification, in order to quash the transaction. To illustrate, in Johnnic Holdings 
Limited v Hosken Consolidated Limited and the Competition Commission,153 where 
Johnnic faced with an unwelcome bid from Hosken sought to interdict the company 
from exercising the shares it had acquired in Johnnic, totally 30 per cent through a 
series of transactions. It attempted to appoint 3 of its directors to the Johnnic board, 
the motion was denied. Later another 10 per cent was acquired totaling 40 per cent, at 
which point a mandatory offer was made to the remaining shareholders, as obliged by 
company law, to acquire their shares. Hosken then notified the merger to the 
Commission. The interdict was brought at the point in time where the transaction had 
been notified but not yet approved, thus Johnnic aimed to “quarantine” the shares 
Hosken had acquired to prohibit them from being able to vote on them until approval 
from the competition authorities has been obtained, irrespective as to whether control 




A merger is approved or recommended for approval by the commission to the 
tribunal, where a specific remedy has been found to adequately address the 
competition and or public interest issues uncovered through the merger review 
process.154 The majority of the conditions imposed by the commission have been 
crafted for the purpose of remedying job loss, while other conditions imposed by the 
competition authorities have been designed to foster competitiveness of small and 
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historically disadvantaged businesses, by removing certain dominant barriers to 
entry.155 
 
When reviewing a merger the Commission will make contact with the largest group 
of consumers and competitors relevant to the markets concerned that the merging 
parties seek to transact in, as these third party concerns serve to aid the Commission 
in their decisions. Public interest concerns of course also factor into the equation due 
to statutory obligation, and thus irrespective of anticompetitive effects social 
considerations must always be borne in mind. 
 
Where such concerns are legitimate competition issues, the Commission will propose 
either structural or behavioural remedies. For example behavioural remedies 
predominantly include issues relating to cross-directorship, in order to limit time 
spent by directors sitting on competing company boards, the Commission accordingly 
limits the disclosure and trade of commercially sensitive information between 
competing companies with mutual shareholders and directors in implementing 
behavioural solutions. Whereas structural conditions may include ordering that the 
shareholding be held in trust and only divested after a specific time period.  
 
Remedies further serve as a compliance mechanism employed by the Commission, as 
regular reporting obligations must be adhered to and submitted periodically. When it 
comes to the Commissions attention that a remedy imposed on a merger has not been 
complied with, it will issue a Notice of Apparent Breach, to which the parties have an 
opportunity to prove no breach has occurred, or to rectify it.  Where these steps are 
not performed or are inadequate the tribunal is empowered to impose administrative 




It is evident that the competition authorities are taking a firm stance on merger control 
and will not hesitate to intervene in a transaction that either poses a competition or 
public interest threat or simply fails to comply with the prescribed formalities. Yet in 
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order to perform this task up to par the limitation that inconsistent definitions of 
control create must be addressed in order to clearly delineate when parties are obliged 
by statute to notify a transaction of a particular size, as to avoid the prohibition of the 
merger, the imposition of conditions, or penalties (to be addressed in the following 
chapter).  
 
Accordingly it is advised where a transaction may cause concern regarding the 
lessening of competition, the parties need seek suitable counsel and address these 
concerns with the Commission pre-merger in order to avoid penalisation, or to 
negotiate the imposition of suitable remedies, as there would be a greater likelihood 
of a positive outcome for the transaction getting through where cooperation is 
forthcoming from the merging parties, and conditions can be agreed to prior to the 
mergers implementation as well as expediting the investigative process. Furthermore, 
both domestic and foreign firms must be mindful of the legislated thresholds set out 
by the Act, regarding merger size and when and in what circumstances a merger will 
be caught for notification before they attempt to implement the transaction, as well as 
observing the relevant merger control filing periods that govern the notification 
process in the applicable jurisdiction. As merger control regimes are increasingly 
becoming more sophisticated on a global scale, following the American and EU 
approaches in addressing mergers that fail to comply with notification formalities. 
 
It is further noted that while there are a myriad of reasons which may lead to firms 
failing to notify a merger, ranging from anticompetitive agreements at play between 
the parties, to getting the deal through as fast as possible for tactical reasons, it is still 
the issue of adequately defining control and understanding the various and diverse 
circumstances in which control may pass from one entity to another (necessitating 
notification), that comprises the predominant reason for firms failing to comply with 








CHAPTER 5: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY 
 
5.1 Introduction & background 
 
Administrative penalties must be implemented with a broader policy objective in 
mind of future deterrence and the protection of successful competition in the markets. 
However these objectives need be balanced at times between firm cooperation and 
expeditious settlement.156 
 
The manner in which administrative penalties are determined is not entirely clear in 
South Africa, as the Act itself does not specifically provide for guidelines in this 
regard. While the Commission has released, and now published a final guideline,157 
following a six-step method adapted from the decision in Competition Commission v. 
Aveng Africa Limited t/a Steeledale and others, 158  it is not a binding policy 
determination thus the Competition Authorities may still exercise discretion in its 
application and therefore it remains to be seen as to whether they will hold the desired 
sway of transparency and predictability. However, it is further still limited by the 10 
per cent statutory cap imposed by section 59(2), as well as being overly convoluted 
and is thus opined to be inadequate.  
 
This is however a useful step in the right direction to a contentious matter, as 
evidenced in Woodland Dairies (Proprietary) Limited and Another v Competition 
Commission, 159  where it was held that administrative penalties can be likened to 
criminal sanctions, accordingly the doctrine of proportionality should be applied when 
determining an appropriate penalty. 160  In Federal Mogul Southern Africa v 
Competition Commission,161 it was stated that when determining the administrative 
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penalty, focus should not only be on the deterrence but regard must be had to a show 
of fairness to the offending party.  
 
It was along these lines that pursuant to a section 4(1)(b) charge of contravention 
Southern Pipeline Contractors (‘SPC’) and Conrite Walls approached the CAC in 
challenge to the administrative penalty imposed, on the grounds that “the 
administrative penalty imposed on them respectively was calculated in contravention 
of the framework laid out in section 59 of the Act and as a result is excessive”.162  
 
The cartel participants submitted that it was unclear as to what constituted ‘total 
turnover’ for calculating an appropriate penalty and the meaning of ‘preceding year’ 
for the purposes of section 59(2) of the Act, and as a result, SPC argued that the 
Tribunal misdirected itself in that it imposed a penalty based on the company’s ‘total 
turnover’ shown in its 2008 statements. 163  The Tribunal usually uses ‘affected 
turnover’, which it declined to employ in this matter. Refusing to follow the 
arithmetic approach applied by the EU,164 and considered factors not listed in section 
59(3) such as the harm caused to the public purse and the taxpayer, and further that 
the case was serious warranting ‘the highest sanction’, finally considering the nature 
and duration of the offence, and on these bases merely imposed the 10% cap limiting 
the amount payable in fines.165 The CAC rejected the Tribunal’s approach, instead 
following the EU method, while not identical to the factors set out in the provision of 
section 59(3), the CAC recommended this approach as providing a basis for 
calculation of the base amount.166  
 
Furthermore SPC submitted that the Tribunal erred in relying on the Commissions 
calculations of net affected turnover.167  Lastly they argued that due to mitigating 
circumstances that merited a reduction in percentage in the calculation of an adequate 
penalty, the imposition of the maximum 10 per cent cap provided for in section 59(2) 
of the Act was overly Draconian.168  
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It is thus submitted that the Tribunal’s approach is undesirable in that it fails to 
adequately consider the factors set out in section 59(3), and further it must be said that 
South Africa is in need of clear legislated guidelines for the determination of an 
appropriate administrative penalty. A binding framework will aid in creating certainty 
and eradicating frivolous litigation. It is opined that the 10 per cent maximum cap 
limiting the amount to be paid is unfavorable in that it does not sufficiently serve as 
deterrent in preventing the perpetrators of anti-competitive conduct from engaging in 
these crimes. It is accordingly recommended that the EU guidelines be followed, even 
where vastly exceeding the permissible cap.169  
 
In short, the purpose of administrative penalties is to promote competition through the 
deterrence of anti-competitive activity. Unfortunately, the imposition of large fines on 
infringing firms does not directly benefit the poor or SMME’s, as collected fines are 
not generally distributed between those that have felt the effects of the harm, but 
rather go straight to the government budget. Administering fines of this nature must 
however further be viewed in light of the financial impact of the conduct, as well as 
public interest related conditions, that may result in substantial excess of the 10 per 
cent cap. Thus alternative terms for remedy should be considered during settlement 
proceedings.170 A more straightforward approach to determining the calculation is 
therefore recommended, firmly focused on the objective of deterrence, based on an 
estimation of the harm suffered, and balanced against other policy goals and 
objectives. 
 
5.2 Recommendation: Economic Development Fund 
 
It is submitted in recommendation that alternative channeling of penalty funds is 
necessary to enhance competition and growth in the markets as well as to alleviate 
poverty. As discussed above, the calculation of such penalties is a nuanced, intricate, 
and at times unclear endevour, these complications then give raise to the question as 
to why once calculated, ordered, and paid by the firm, are the funds not being 
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carefully apportioned towards rectifying the harm suffered to the South African 
economy and poor, by establishing a source with which to support SMME market 
entry and sustainable presence, which in turn will alleviate poverty and support 
working class entrepreneurs.  
 
Through this lens, vigorous law competition enforcement can be a powerful policy 
tool in ensuring that there is efficient resource allocation in the markets as well as 
catering for the needs of the poor. Priority must always be afforded (by the 
competition authorities) to anti-competitive practices affecting sectors relating to 
essential goods and services in relieving poverty.  
 
On these bases it is clear that South Africa as a developing country need design and 
develop legislative provisions and amend the Act, in order to clearly set out that the 
revenue raised from anti-competitive conduct resulting in damage to the markets and 
the furtherance of economic disparity be funneled into a well administered fund to be 
established by government, governed by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
partnered with the competition authorities, and overseen by the Minister of Finance. It 
is opined that South Africa ought to implement its competition legislation in a manner 
that contributes to the maintenance of more expansive economic and social goals, 
including equitable participation in the markets by SMME’s, a more diverse racial 
demographic, as well as employment creation and retention. 
 
It is crucial to guarantee entrants have access to essential facilities and to empower 
consumer switching on a timely and efficient basis. Financing entry and expansion is 
a fundamental part of the puzzle, given the time and resources needed to build South 
African markets in order to reach the scale required to be competitive in a variety of 
arenas on a global scale, in addition to creating a movement for financing rivals so as 
to viably take on formidable incumbents in local markets. 
 
To give a practical example of how the fund could be structured and implemented, the 
case of Competition Commission v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd,171  provides a useful 
illustration with regard to the settlement arrangement for Pioneer’s participation in 
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cartel activity in the bread, wheat, white maize milling, poultry and egg industries. 
The Commission found consumers had been harmed through price hikes on essential 
food items, as well as creating barriers to entry for SMME’s, and can thus be used as 
a possible model to be further developed over time and through experience, inasmuch 
that the Commission surpassed traditional penalties and addressed equity issues head 
on. Included in the settlement was an exigency stipulating that the company modify 
its pricing by reducing its gross profit, furthermore an ‘Agroprocessing 
Competitiveness Fund’ was established using R250 million obtained from the 
administrative penalty of R500 million, in order to facilitate and promote 
competitiveness, employment, growth in food value chains, and to provide finance to 
SMME’s, and finally to increase expenditure and output to create jobs. 172   The 
Commission has since found that the fund has positively accomplished its purposes of 
enabling access and development into the affected sectors, together with job 
creation.173 
 
There is thus strong evidence supporting the submission that penalties from 
competition cases should be channeled into a development finance fund for rivals and 
entrants, particularly black industrialists. This is in line with the objectives of the 
Competition Act in opening up the economy to participation by all. 
 
With regard to the evaluation and criteria to be used, it is central to consider the 
ability for firms to be successful competitors, with the offering, scale and expertise 
necessary.  
 
The idea is to afford the long-term finance for essential education and competence 
expansion. Finance should not consequently be offered to just one or two entrants but 
to those who meet the criteria, acknowledging that several will unavoidably fail 
nevertheless, it is impossible at the outset to predict which, rivalry between 
contenders being a natural component of the progression. 
 
Moreover, it must forever be born in mind that finance, without the corresponding 
measures to address the range of barriers o entry and growth, will not be a successful 
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intervention. The schema for creating entry to the South African economy should thus 
be based on altering the ex ante procedures in economic regulation to favour new 
entrants, and to guarantee that ultra vires executives can be effectually opposed, in 
addition to increased victory in ex post enforcement against anticompetitive conduct. 
Hence it is necessary to amendment the Act to ensure that the competition procedure 
is protected and the ability of smaller participants and black industrialists to enter and 
grow can be given influence in decision-making. Complementary measures at 
government level are further necessary in order to configure space and open up 




In submitting an answer to research question 8, as to whether the 10 per cent cap is 
sufficient, Davis JP held it was sufficient. Adv. le Roux gave a deeper analysis, 
answering ‘I think so – though the Commission should be doing more with its 
advocacy powers to educate business re notification thresholds etc. – management is 
aware of prohibited practices compliance, not necessarily always with merger 
control. If the usual attorney isn’t a competition lawyer, the problem is 
compounded.’174 
 
The ENS team submitted ‘[t]he prospect of paying an administrative penalty of up to 
10% of your annual turnover is a compelling deterrent, in my view. It is also not the 
only remedy at the disposal of the Competition Authorities. See also the possibility of 
divestiture orders (section 60(l)(a)); and declaratory orders rendering parts of the 
impugned merger agreement void (section 60(l)(b)).’175 
 
Maniom opined ‘[t]hey are sufficient but I think penalties for failure to notify mergers 
have not benefitted from having to follow the same penalty factors for prohibited 
practice cases in terms of section 59 of the Act. I think we should look at merger 
penalties by applying different considerations that are a better fit for considering 
failures to notify.’176 
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5.4 Conclusion  
 
Thus it is proposed in recommendation that rather than merely being indiscriminately 
channeled into the states coffers, the funds seized by the authorities through these 
penalties from undertakings who are found in contravention of the Act for failure to 
notify a merger, rather be utilised to structure and implement momentum in our 
markets, its international competitiveness, and the prosperity of our people. 
Corporations can then provide the top deals for consumers, safeguarding poorer 
households from overpaying for consumer products, and accelerating access to a 
wider range of goods. The conceivable prospects for competition policy, including 
competition law enforcement and pro-competition regulations, to spur gains in 
productivity, enhance competitiveness, and promote faster economic growth, all the 
while contributing to poverty reduction are not so far off that they are unattainable, all 






















CHAPTER SIX: CRIMINAL SANCTIONS  
 
6.1 Background & proposed extension of criminal sanctions for failure to notify 
 
White-collar crime perpetrated by gun jumping corporate cowboys has far reaching 
and devastating effects on a developing nations economy. This is no different within 
the South African ambit of commerce. In considering alternative punishment for 
failure to notify, where monetary penalties alone fail in serving as a sufficient 
deterrent, it is thus herein posited that there ought to be potential latitude for 
criminalisation of such conduct, where its anti-competitive effects are far reaching 
with regards to both the economy and the poor.  
 
In the analysis to follow on the implications this might render, recent amendments 
tabled by the competition authorities, in addition to the current case law on failure to 
notify will be examined. As both indicate an emerging trend in South African 
jurisprudence towards a no tolerance policy, and away from the permissive corporate 
leniency of the past. Reference to various foreign jurisdictions, both European and 
African, which criminally sanction failure to notify, will be postulated as evidence of 
such a penalisation's viability and efficaciousness. It is herein opined to be the correct 
and logical direction to move towards, as penalties alone have not been satisfactorily 
preventative punishments. However, this will need to be progressively achieved over 
some time before implementation is possible.  
 
6.2 Recent amendments to the legislation introducing criminal sanctions to South 
African competition law 
 
In justifying the introduction of criminal sanctions in South African competition law, 
one needs look no further than the new amendments to the Act. The insertion of 
section 73A into the primary Act after section 73 is a revolutionary provision and 
should be welcomed, having taking almost immediate effect as of 1st May 2016, it 
reads as follows:  
‘(1) A person commits an offence if, while being a director of a firm or while having 
engaged or purporting to be engaged by a firm in a position having management 
authority within the firm, such person – 
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(a) Caused the firm to engage in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4 
(1)(b); or  
(b) Knowingly acquiesced in the firm engaging in a prohibited practice in terms 
of section 4 (1)(b). 
(2) For purposes of subsection (1)(b), knowingly acquiesced means having acquiesced 
while having actual knowledge of the relevant conduct by the firm.’ 
 
It is clear from the provision set out above that significant changes have been 
introduced to the South African Competition Act enabled by enforcement the 
Amendment Act into law, now introducing criminal liability directly onto managers 
or directors found to be engaging in cartel activity, a revolutionary change in our law, 
and somewhat of a leap from the previous imposition of fines alone. 
 
Peter Whelan argues that cartel formation involves price-fixing, output restriction, 
market allocation, and/or bid-rigging, acts which are extremely harmful and damaging 
and may have a number of destructive effects for customers, consumers, the 
competitive process and the economy. It may be likened to a sophisticated form of 
theft involving the deceitful acquisition of wealth that rightly belongs to the 
consumer.5177 
 




Merger control in Irish statue defines a concentration as ‘the acquisition of control 
sufficient to allow the exercise of decisive influence’.  
 
This extends to the acquisition of assets and full function joint ventures. The threshold 
for notification being worldwide turn over of each of two or more undertakings 
involved of no less than € 50 million (as recently increased by the new Act from € 40 
                                                        
177 Tsholofelo Letsike The criminalising of cartels – How effective will the new Section 73A of the 
Competition Amendment Act be? Presented at Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, 
Mandela Institute & University of Johannesburg Seventh Annual Competition Law, Economics & 
Policy Conference, Johannesburg, 5 – 6 September 2013. 
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million, in order to reduce administrative burdens), and irrespective of turnover, all 
media mergers must be notified. There are strict time limits that must be adhered to, 
and a substantive test is applied in order to ascertain whether there has been a 
substantial lessening of competition in markets for goods and services within the 
Republic of Ireland. This test is applied in the US as well as South Africa,178 and is 
similar to the EU merger control charter. 
 
The Competition Acts that govern Irish Merger control include the Competition Act 
of 2002, and the contemporary addition of the Competition & Consumer Protection 
Act of 2014. These pieces of legislation make provision for certain criminal sanctions 
with regards to the breach of merger control principles. Merger control rules are 
predominantly laid down in part three. Notably section 18(9) sets out that failure to 
notify the Irish authorities of a merger is a criminal offence for an individual in 
control of the undertaking, a consequence of conviction for the indictable offence 
being disqualification from holding office in the capacity of a company director. 
 
The 2014 updated Act makes significant alterations in various regards, however the 
take home message remains that it is a criminal offence and a civil wrong to 
participate in an anti-competitive arrangement. Consequently not only fines sounding 
in money, but also potential imprisonment may result from breaching the provision, 
for an austere and exacting incarceration period of up to ten years. Any notifying 
party can, within 40 days, appeal to the High Court to either block a merger, or to 
allow it on the basis of conditions being imposed. Issues of both fact and law form the 
substance of such an appeal. 
 
6.3.2 Developed competition regimes: Canada  
 
The Canadian federal law contains both civil and criminal provisions. The Act 
requires pre-merger notification as set out by section 114 of Part IX. Failure to notify 
a merger of any size is a criminal offence subject to these provisions. However there 
have been no convictions to date for failure to notify a merger without good and 
                                                        
178 See the effects test. 
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sufficient cause. As summary conviction to an administrative penalty of up to C$ 50, 
000 is an available alternative to conviction on inditement.179 
 
6.3.3 African anti-trust: Kenya  
 
In other jurisdictions within the African continent, three bodies of law govern the 
Kenyan competition regime. The Competition Act no. 12 of 2010, overseeing 
domestic regulation, the COMSA Competition Regulations, and the East African 
Community Competition Act of 2006, which is not yet operational.  The focus will 
correspondingly be on the domestic component.  
 
The Act defines a merger broadly, based on de facto control being acquired through 
exerting decision-making influence over an entity, in the form of the right to veto a 
company election. Accordingly, for the merger to proceed to implementation, 
approval must be obtained from the Kenyan competition authorities (CAK). Thus 
similarly to the South African regime, mergers are notifiable as per a threshold 
system. In order to be caught for notification, the combined turnover of the 
undertakings must exceed KSh 1 billion. Where a merger falls bellow this threshold, 
an application to the competition authority must be made for exclusion. Thresholds 
are however set separately with regards to the carbon-based mineral and healthcare 
sectors.180 
 
Under the Kenyan statute, it is an offence for any party to implement a merger 
without prior approval from Competition Authority of Kenya. This is manifest from 
Part IV dealing with mergers, and more specifically section 42 setting out control of 
mergers. Subsection 5 thereto provides that such a party concerned ‘shall be liable to 
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years, or to a fine not 
exceeding KSh 10 million, or both’.181 
 
An illustration of this provision at work is evident from the contemporary matter 
concerning market research company Ipsos, the executives of which faced weighty 
                                                        
179 International Comparative Legal Guidelines 2017. 
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administrative penalties and jail time. After their failure to notify the purchase of its 
competitor, and to gain regulatory approval prior to the implementation of its 
acquisition of the Aegis Group, creating the third largest global market research 
company in the world.  
 
In lodging the complaint with the Director of Public Prosecution in order to seek to 
impose criminal sanctions, the CAK clearly demonstrate that African anti-trust is 
serious about law enforcement, and the importance of promoting and enhancing 
competition in order to alleviate poverty.182 
 
Consequently, foreign investors would be prudent to appreciate the merger control 
repercussions for Africa, as sanctions as sever as imprisonment may result, as well as 
administrative penalties. Both of which may have significant ramifications for 
conducting business in Africa, in relation to both cost and time.  
  
6.4 Criticisms  
 
While there is a worry that criminal sanctions may negatively affect the impact and 
efficaciousness of the CLP,183 in that it would sufficiently lessen incentive to use the 
policy and enter into consent orders.184 As the policy has in the past been heralded for 
being an example of the Commission’s finest work with regards to competition law 
enforcement and curbing cartel activity.185 Conversely, it is herein submitted that thus 
far the imposition of monetary penalties alone have been insufficiently deterrent in 
nature, consequently there is a call for the potential threat of imprisonment, which 
would act as satisfactory restriction. This would be justifiable if it facilitated and had 
the ends of crime reduction in the future. This application of deterrence theory within 
the ambit of non-notification sanctions is no novel concept to Competition legislation 
in numerous jurisdictions, both European and within the African continent.  
 
With regards to the constitutional questions that may arise from the introduction of 
s73A, it is unfortunate that the President did not refer the Bill to the Constitutional 
                                                        
182 A 2014 matter. 
183 http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CLP-public-version-12052008.pdf. 
184 Op cit note 138 at 226.  
185 Chantal Lavoie South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A five year review 3. 
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Court for a decision on its constitutionality. However, South Africa has a unique 
provision when it comes to the question of constitutionality of a Bill. The section 
(4)(b) provides for either a priori or a posteriori constitutional review. This means that 
prior to a Bill becoming an Act, it can be referred to the Constitutional Court for a 
theoretical review. In addition, after an Act has been promulgated, it can also be 
referred to the Constitutional Court. 47186 
 
It remains to be seen therefore, if the constitutionality of the new section 73A of the 
Act will be sent to the Constitutional Court for a review a posteriori. Perhaps such a 
review could provide clarity and potentially pave the way for the introduction of 
criminal sanctions being implemented against firms that fail to notify large mergers 
within a stipulated time period.  
 
Furthermore, the provisions of the recent insertion into the Competition Act, emulate 
the provisions of the Companies Act and Regulations of 2008 in reference to the 
duties and liabilities of directors, as set out in s 76 and 77, as well as at the common 
law. More and more corporate structures are being held to account to all stakeholders. 
This accountability must further be perceived through the lens of good corporate 
governance, as illustrated by the King III, and more recently and radically, by the 
King IV draft that was released for comment, setting the standard of care with not just 
a profit focus, but further with a social and environmental objective, embodying a far 




The data are reflecting a similar set of findings. The commentary on criminal 
sanctions indicate a general approval of the newly inserted section 73(A), however 
where criminal sanctions are considered and extended to ambit of failure to notify a 
large merger, there seems to be consensus that this is a step too far, based on the 
NPA’s levels of competencies. 
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Davis JP being the only outlier answered ‘I am against this provision’. ‘Also are the 
NPA up to the job?’187 
 
Adv. le Roux submitted, ‘Excellent enhancement of deterrence. Risk of undermining 
compliance since the CLP is the reason that we’ve uncovered cartels to prosecute 
generally. Concern with NPA’s ability or inclination to prosecute. Very concerned 
that sec 4(1)(b) as currently drafted is too broad and cases other than hard core 
cartels may attract criminal sanction unfairly  - not what could have been intended. 
Not sure failure to notify should be criminalized.  Better advocacy and education to 
raise awareness, and penalties are sufficient deterrence in my view.  Also 
Commission can retrospectively review mergers so competition harm can be 
mitigated.’188 
 
The ENS team held ‘International trends suggest that criminal sanctions for 
individuals involved in cartel activity are the only effective means of dissuading firms 
from engaging in such conduct. The financial rewards arising from a well-run cartel 
tend to overshadow existing sanctions (such as financial penalties and divestiture 
orders). I am inclined to agree. In this context, SA’s introduction of criminal 
sanctions for cartel behavior is neither radical nor controversial. That being said, the 
legislation introduces significant practical and legal problems, which militate against 
its effective implementation. These problems include - (i) different evidentiary 
standards; (ii) constitutional concerns; and (Hi) institutional concerns (i.e. the 
capacity constraints and limited specialist expertise of the investigating and 
prosecuting authorities). The answer varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The US, 
for instance, has a commendable and effective track record. For the most part, 
however, the criminalization of cartel activities is a relatively new phenomenon, with 
the consequence that there is not a wealth of case law / jurisprudence available. In 
addition, this sanction is not invoked with any great frequency in those jurisdictions 
where it does exist.’189 
 
                                                        




Maniom submitted, ‘[w]hilst I support criminalizing cartel conduct I think the present 
provisions will not work. Nor do I believe the NPA has the skills or the capacity to 
prosecute cartel cases. Countries that have two different authorities enforcing against 
cartels – the competition authority against the firm applying a civil burden of proof 
and the prosecuting authority against the individual applying a criminal law standard 
have generally been far less successful than the US DOJ where the same institution 
does both.’190 
 
6.6 Recommendations  
 
It is therefore recommended that sterner penalties such as criminal sanctions be 
progressively realised slowly over time, being imposed gradually, and implemented in 
a manner that would not see negative consequences for the markets and competition 
as a whole in South Africa.  
 
While section 73(A) may be an appropriate method for dealing with hardcore cartel 
offences, perhaps our developing economic structures are still too unstable to carry 
the weight of such hefty punishment with regards to enforcement for failure to notify 
being imposed on the larger players in the markets, and will thus manifest in an 
overly Draconian treatment of South African competition law, within the scope and 
limitations of a developing nations volatile commercial footings. 
 
6.6.1 A dual system 
 
It is submitted that in order for the criminalisation of failure to notify to be 
implemented with beneficial results, a dual system of administration need be adopted 
between both criminal and competition law. Therefore the Competition Authorities 
and the National prosecuting Authority need work in a dynamic symmetry when it 
comes to enforcement. Operating under a directive and on the basis of a 
Memorandum of Understanding with regards to who is tasked with which duties. 
However for effective criminal prosecution of firms who engage in anti-competitive 
conduct, the relevant authorities as well as the legislature need to take measures to 
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effectively bridge the gaps between their competencies. This of course may lead to 
various complications in initial application, where prosecuting authorities lack 
competition training, and where there are insufficient criminal practitioners within the 
Commission.  
 
6.7 Conclusion  
 
In submitting for a similar criminal sanction (as discussed above), in South Africa to 
be implemented effectively criminalising failure of firms to notify a large merger, 
over and above the new amendments to the Act, such that directors engaging in cartel 
conduct may now face jail time in addition to hefty penalties. For it to be practically 
applicable in implementation, it would necessitate the Competition Authorities 
working in conjunction with the National Prosecuting Authority. It is acknowledged 
that this will not be without its difficulties, however for the greater good.  
 
Education and outreach should thus not only be aimed at the public, in order to hone 
into the skills of the existing competition and criminal practitioners that are already 
prosecuting this conduct, constant training should be considered. Indeed a dual 
administration can work efficiently and effectively if there is a balance of criminal 
trained attorneys within the Commission and competition trained practitioners in the 
NPA. There needs to be a Memorandum of Understanding in terms of which for a 
certain period of time, there is an exchange of staff between the two institutions, with 
the aim of better understanding how the other works. This would hopefully lead to a 
harmonisation of processes. Before all of which can be done however, there needs to 
be a cohesive definition in place of what amounts to control and a change thereof, that 
is consistent across both fields of Companies law and Competition law. The 
definitional gap must be bridged by the necessary legislative amendments (as set out 
above) in order to lessen and curb companies actively seeking to abuse this gap to the 







CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION  
 
7.1 A summary of the findings 
 
In trying to best or at least adequately define control for the purposes of merger 
notification, the study examined and compared the relevant legislation in order to 
establish if the definitions provided for in the Competition Act and that those set ot in 
the Companies Act are in need of reform in any regarded, and when compared, leave 
open any potential for lacunas in the legal matrix. 
 
It has become evident through this study, that both concepts of a merger, and that of 
control as defined by section 12, have been formulated in a confusing manner,191 
consequently making the provisions difficult to interpret in certain cases.192 This is 
clear from the inconsistency displayed by the courts’ application of the section. In the 
Distillers case, the CAC opined on the purpose of chapter 3 being to carefully monitor 
transactions that may substantially lessen competition.193 Davis JP further remarked 
that it is also aimed at promoting competition in certain market structures.  
 
The Tribunal however offered a better interpretation in the preceding decision on the 
matter. In as much that it was constructed in a wider manner, and held ‘the legislature 
intended to raise the burden of notification to avoid undesirable consequences on all 
involved of having to unravel transactions afterwards’.194 Thus it is has been observed 
that the obligation to notify must be construed broadly,195 and in summary, section 
12(2) is not determinative in establishing the meaning of the word control. 
 
Other cases however have illustrated a more restrictive view, further attesting to the 
erratic interpretation and application of section 12. The interpretation of the merger 
provisions shown in the Johnnic case differs from that in Cape Empowerment Trust, 
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to the extent that authors Kemp and Sutherland have noted that this ‘seems 
illogical’.196  
 
It is therefore submitted that these legislative problems need to be cured in order to 
facilitate consistency and a balanced reading of the provisions governing merger 
control for a more stable outcome. It is recommended that a solution may be to relax 
the provision aimed at defining control to give it a wider effect, in line with Canadian, 
European and Kenyan merger control.   
 
While the provisions of section 12(2)(g) of the Competition Act, mirrored in section 2 
(d) are said to be catch-all provisions in that only a ‘material influence’ is necessary, 
it is submitted that the courts are not constructing the section widely enough, and thus 
the legislative failure to adequately define control is compounded by the courts 
inconsistent reading and application of the section. 
 
This problem is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the amount of mergers caught for 
notification is limited by thresholds set that are determined in relation to annual 
turnover, thus limiting the administrative burden in that regard.197 
 
Nevertheless due to the definitional issues addressed, the pressures of time and the 
constraints of commerce, as well as potential anticompetitive conduct at play, the 
mandatory notification process is often avoided when implementing transactions. The 
penalty for which being an administrative fine as set out above in chapter 5, in which 
it was posited that the methods of calculation need be aligned closer to those 
formulated by the European competition authorities.  
 
 It was further submitted that the funds pooled from administrative penalties ought to 
rather be directed into an economic fund, rather than being blindly channeled into 
state coffers, as it currently stands.  
 
In considering the potential for criminal sanctions in relation to the failure of an 
undertaking to notify, it is concluded that while this may be a Draconian move, it may 
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exist only in theory (as it does in other jurisdictions) to serve as a further deterrent, as 
well as to clearly alert merging parties, specifically foreign investors, that infringing 
these provisions of the Act will e met with sever consequence, in order to protect 
South African markets from exploitation. The worry of course being NPA 
involvement, thus adequate guidelines would need to be established to raise the level 
of competencies necessary to handle competition law matters. However this alone 
may be insufficient to bridge the knowledge gap.  
 
The purpose of developing predictable, clear and comprehensible merger transaction 
concepts is to ensure levels of stability in the markets through merger review 
processes, where transactions may potentially substantially lessen or prevent 
competition. However such a system should simultaneously avoid an overly 
constrictive approach where no risk to competition is at play and other less intrusive 
means are available. Accordingly, the objective must be to minimise cost implications 
of type I errors, where non-problematic mergers are made to notify, and at the same 
time avert type II errors, where problematic transactions escape the scrutiny of the 
merger review process.  
 
This is necessary to maintain and uphold the principles of competition policy itself 
within the merger review process. The function of which being, to act as regulatory 
tool facilitating market functionality and efficacy in a free market environment, 
implemented through the various channels of authority, investigative bodies, and 
legislated practice. The purpose of competition policy being to act as a conduit for 
facilitating business growth, consumer welfare and protection, as well as to promote 
the public interest of South African Society as a whole, by fostering competitive 
behaviour within the sphere of commerce. Thus it is essential that the legislation be 
clearly set out to promote these principles, in order to allow for the most beneficial 
interpretation by the courts who give practical effect, application and meaning to 
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ANNEXURE A: ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
 
My name is Chanel Cilombo and I am a Commercial LLM candidate at UCT, under 
the supervision of Dr Jacqui Yeats and Judge Dennis Davis. I am conducting research 
to gather necessary data in fulfillment of the dissertation component of my 
programme, and would like you to please be a participant if you are kindly willing to 
consent. You are of course free to decline at any point. 
The nature of my research is as follows: 
My research in this study will examine the definitions of control under the 
Competition Act (the “Act”), comparatively to that of company law notions of 
control. Specifically the reliance on a Companies Act interpretation for what 
constitutes issued share capital, and whether there is a consequent need to develop the 
legislation in order to bridge the definitional gap for the purpose of adequately 
regulating merger notification. 
In order to undertake such an inquiry, it is important to consider the definitions of a 
merger, and of control, in terms of section 12(1)(a) and section 12(2) of the Act, 
respectively, as well as relevant sections 13(3)(A), 14(1)(b), 16(2) and 17, before 
considering the case law, and to weigh it up against company law definitions of 
control, which in my opinion are lacking. 
This has become an important area of contestation, as firms have gone to great lengths 
to avoid notification. A potential reason being that those in opposition to the 
transaction taking place, whether they be rival bidders or competitors of the acquiring 
firm, may seek to use failure to notify as a justification in attempting to stifle the 
transaction, via interdicting its implementation. Several cases for examination and 
review fall into this category. 
A further subtopic for examination in this study is, if and when there has in fact been 
a failure to notify that has taken place, how should the relevant competition 
authorities, namely the tribunal, calculate the administrative penalty, as the Act does 
not provide guidelines in this regard. Sections 59(2) and 59(3) are insufficient in 
themselves and thus South Africa is in need of adequate legislative guidelines for 
determining the appropriate penalty. Further, are penalties alone sufficient deterrent 
or would the potential introduction of criminal sanctions be beneficial (in line with 
recent amendments to the Act now introducing criminalization for the first time in our 
law)? 
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In addition to your participation, I further request that based on your experience and 
standing in the relevant areas of specialty that you consent to waive confidentially and 
anonymity, as I believe your identities will benefit the research. 
If you do not consent to the waiver of confidentiality and/or anonymity for whatever 
reason, please inform me of such a request with your answer submission and your 
identity will be protected. 
The methods to be used once clearance and consent have been obtained, will be the 
completion of a written email questionnaire that I will send you and you can return at 



























ANNEXURE B: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
10-PART WRITTEN ANSWER RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE: 
Participant:  
 
Field of expertise in law:  
 
1. Is there a gap between the Competition Act definition of control and the 
companies law definition of control? 
2. Are either or both areas lacking in definition? 
3. If there is a gap, is it being abused by merging firms to escape notification? Please 
provide examples. 
4. What other reasons may companies actively seek to abuse this gap for? 
5. What is needed to remedy and bridge this gap? 
6. What are the most common reasons for failure to notify? Please provide examples. 
7. Is failure to notify ever an indication of or precursor to anti-competitive 
behaviours? Please provide examples. 
8. Are penalties sufficient punishments and is 10% of annual turn over enough of a 
deterrent? 
9. What are your thoughts on the recent addition to the Competition Act (as 
amended), now introducing criminal sanctions for cartel conduct under s 73A? 
10. In your view, do you think jurisdictions that implement criminal sanctions for 













ANNEXURE C: PARTICIPANTS’ ANSWERS 
 
Judge Dennis Davis 
 
1. There is a significant provision, s 2 of the Companies Act. However in 
competition law, the courts decide the question.  
 
2. Yes, in competition law. 
 
3. Don’t know but the question of control is problematic in terms of competition 
law. 
 




6. In competition law, the vagueness of the definition of control. 
 




9. I am against this provision. 
 
10. It depends on the country – here it may cause problems for the CLP 














2. The point is not that there is a lack of definition, it’s that the two Acts are 
aiming at different concepts of control.  The Co Act reflects the policy to 
regulate control so as to prevent its abuse with respect to 
governance/shareholders – protecting minorities and subsidiaries, as well as to 
trigger the reporting requirements in corporate groups.  
The Comp Act is concerned about changes in control that would alter market 
power/structure/conditions of competition – such as by increasing the 
likelihood of coordination or concentrations that could produce dominant 
positions that may be abused. So it is a wider, more flexible definition, 
without hard/bright lines like the 35% deemed control provision in Co law. 
The need to understand Co law concepts of votes/rights and relationships (eg 
concert parties) applies in Comp law of course, but the need for certainty that 
the former requires for corporate governance could be a hindrance in 
competition/merger control circumstances.  A party may be able to impact the 
market and therefore competition without falling into one of the definitions of 
controller for Co law purposes.  Its identity and conduct may be relevant for 
merger control though. 
There are many Co law scenarios and questions, though, that comp law 
ignores as a result.  Eg issues around meaning of “beneficially owns” 
“majority of shares”, how to account for vote allocation arrangements or 
shareholder agreements on voting (voting pools, for eg). 
But, frankly, the Caxton decision and the meaning of sec 12(2)(g) in 
particular, provide sufficient guidance for merger control purposes. 
 




5. Since I don’t have a problem with the different definitions, I am not sure there 
needs to be any remedy. 
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6. Most common that I’ve seen are interpretation and understanding of control so 
that nothing changes with the merger – i.e. a disagreement with the 
Commission on whether control has changed. 
 
7. Not in my experience, haven’t seen a correlation between notification failures 
and prohibited practices. 
 
8. I think so – though the Commission should be doing more with its advocacy 
powers to educate business re notification thresholds etc – management is 
aware of prohibited practices compliance, not nec always with merger control.  
If the usual attorney isn’t a competition lawyer, the problem is compounded. 
 
9. Excellent enhancement of deterrence 
Risk of undermining compliance since the CLP is the reason that we’ve 
uncovered cartels to prosecute generally 
Concern with NPA’s ability or inclination to prosecute 
Very concerned that sec 4(1)(b) as currently drafted is too broad and cases 
other than hard core cartels may attract criminal sanction unfairly  - not what 
could have been intended 
 
10. Not sure failure to notify should be criminalized.  Better advocacy and 
education to raise awareness, and penalties are sufficient deterrence in my 
view.  Also Commission can retrospectively review mergers so competition 













1, 2, & 3. The question as to whether there is any alignment in the concepts of 
“control” in the Companies Act raises interesting issues. 
It is vital not to consider the concept of “control” in a vacuum in both the Companies 
Act and the Competition Act but rather to examine control in a particular context. 
Thus, for example, “control” in company law is relevant in the definition of holding 
and subsidiary companies (Section 3 of the Companies Act), the prohibition of 
providing financial assistance to acquire securities (Section 44 of the Companies Act) 
and the prohibition of intra-group finance (Section 45 of the Companies Act). 
 
For your purposes the question of “control” arises in the context of merger control. In 
this context control for Competition Act purposes as set out in Section 12(2) of the 
Competition Act : there are certain bright line tests - Section 12(2)(a),(b), (c); and the 
overriding omnibus test in Section 12(2)(g) which rests on the ability to “materially 
influence the policy of the juristic person in a manner comparable …” 
 
Control for Companies Act purposes is relevant in the obligation set out in Section 
123 of the Companies Act to make a mandatory offer where a party acquires at least 
35% of the voting securities of a company . The threshold of 35% is deemed control. 
The important question is whose securities must be aggregated to determine whether 
the 35% threshold has been crossed? In this regard the securities held by the 
following parties must be aggregated : the acquiring party; related parties and inter-
related parties of the acquiring party; and persons acting in concert with the acquiring 
party. 
 
It will be seen from the aforegoing that in merger control, the Competition Act 
definition is wider in that Section 12(2)(g) has a potentially broad sweep. 
 
The Companies Act, although it does not have the breadth of Section 12(2)(g) (save in 
the case of Close Corporations), is potentially wider in that it includes the three 
categories of persons referred to [in the aforementioned] paragraphs … above. 
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As regards merger control for company law purposes, the 35% threshold is 
conclusive. 
 
The only issue that arises is whether there are concert parties whose shares may be 
taken in account. This is a factual enquiry to be answered in each case. 
 
For competition law purposes, the 35% threshold is not relevant. 
 
In an acquisition of securities of more than 35% or less than 35%, control may be 
achieved dependent on the application of the principles set out in Section 12(2)(g) to 
the shareholder profile of the company concerned. Thus, in a company where there is 
a large number of shareholders with relatively small shareholdings, control may be 
achieved with less than 35%. Conversely, in a company with a smaller number of 
large shareholders, control may only be achieved with more than 35%. 
 
There are sometimes debates in the competition law space relating to the relevance of 
shares held by related and concert parties. 
 
Thus, you will see that the concepts of control in company law and competition law 
are based on different philosophical and policy considerations. The tests for 














ENS competition department 
 
1. I don't believe so. Apart from the fact that part of the Companies Act 
definition of "control" derives from the Competition Act, I regard them as 
discreet pieces of legislation - each subject to its own case law, jurisprudence 
and policy drivers. Of course, the jurisprudence may overlap, from time to 
time, but the essential approach to each section must be informed by the 
broader statutory context in which it exists.  
With this in mind, the Competition Act serves a fundamentally different 
purpose to the Companies Act (in general); and the "control" provisions in 
each serve fundamentally different purposes (in particular). 
 
2. In commenting on the definition of "control" in the Competition Act only, 1 
do not believe that it is lacking in definition. If anything, it is too complicated, 
in my view, and could be reduced substantially. Given the nuances applicable 
to "control" from a competition law perspective, my preference is for a simply 
worded, broad definition that is given meaning, over time, in case law, policy 
documents and guidelines. 
 
3. No, in my experience there is no statutory gap/lacuna/loophole being 
ab(used) by forms to escape their merger notification obligations. 
 




6. In my experience, missed merger notifications tend to fall into one of the 
following categories: 
a. Bona fide errors, where the missed merger is occasioned by ignorance of the 
obligation; mistaken interpretation of the applicable law; or mistaken 
application of the applicable facts. 
b. Deliberate decisions to ignore merger notification obligations owing to the 
commercial exigencies of the transaction (usually time related). 
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c. Deliberate decisions to ignore merger notification obligations owing to an 
apprehension that the transaction will ultimately be prohibited or subject to 
onerous conditions. 
 
7. It could be. The category of missed merger in (c) above may be indicative 
of underlying anti-competitive behavior. 
 
8. The prospect of paying an administrative penalty of up to 10% of your 
annual turnover is a compelling deterrent, in my view. It is also not the only 
remedy at the disposal of the Competition Authorities. 
• See also the possibility of divestiture orders (section 60(l)(a)); and 
declaratory orders rendering parts of the impugned merger agreement void 
(section 60(l)(b)). 
• Attached are the Commission's draft guidelines outlining its proposed 
approach to missed mergers. 
 
9. • International trends suggest that criminal sanctions for individuals 
involved in cartel activity are the only effective means of dissuading firms 
from engaging in such conduct. The financial rewards arising from a well-run 
cartel tend to overshadow existing sanctions (such as financial penalties and 
divestiture orders). I am inclined to agree. 
• In this context, SA’s introduction of criminal sanctions for cartel behavior is 
neither radical nor controversial. 
• That being said, the legislation introduces significant practical and legal 
problems, which militate against its effective implementation. These problems 
include - (i) different evidentiary standards; (ii) constitutional concerns; and 
(Hi) institutional concerns (i.e. the capacity constraints and limited specialist 
expertise of the investigating and prosecuting authorities). 
 
10. • The answer varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The US, for instance, 
has a commendable and effective track record. 
• For the most part, however, the criminalization of cartel activities is a 
relatively new phenomenon, with the consequence that there is not a wealth of 
case law / jurisprudence available. 
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• In addition, this sanction is not invoked with any great frequency in those 




































1. I don’t think of this as a gap. The notion of control serves different purposes 
under the respective Acts and hence we shouldn’t expect the definitions of 
control to be the same. In competition law a change of control can mean a 
change in the behavior of the firm in the market which may have implications 
for competition and hence its concept of control is wider than that in company 
law. For Competition law  a change in de facto control is as important, if not 
more important than a change in de jure control . 
 
2. For reasons advanced above I don’t think so. 
 
3. There are firms who have failed to notify a merger and when this has been 
uncovered, have used as a fact in mitigation that because the change in control 
did not amount to a change in control in company law i.e. they did not own 
more than 50% plus one of the shares or they didn’t have control over the 
board, that they did not know this was a notifiable change of control in 
competition law. If you look at the Competition Tribunal website and search 
cases on failure to notify mergers you would find some examples. 
 
4. There are reasons that firms seek to evade notifying a merger but this is not 
influenced by the gap between company law and competition law. Because a 
firm may not implement a notifiable merger without prior clearance from the 
competition authorities which may take some time to come through, firms 
may seek to evade notification for strategic reasons. For instance there may be 
rival bidders for the same firm (See Bidvest Adcock) or a hostile 
takeover.(Harmony Goldfields,) 
 
5. I see no problem here see my comment under question one. 
 
6. See answer under 4.  In other instance firms may not know they have to notify 
because a change of de facto control as opposed to de jure control is often 
opaque or uncertain. For instance under section 12(2)(g) de facto control is 
very widely defined and unsurprisingly there are instances where firms did not 
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consider that control had changed but others considered it had. (see the Caxton 
v SABC and Multichoice cases both Tribunal and CAC decisions.)  
 
7. Strangely enough this is seldom the reason. Most are driven by the need to get 
a merger through quickly for the reasons I explained earlier. I can think of 
only two cases where there was probably and anticompetitive motive both 
involving health care mergers. One involving Netcare as the acquiring firm 
and the other Life Health care. Both cases are on our website I cannot recall 
now which the target firms were. 
 
8. They are sufficient but I think penalties for failure to notify mergers have not 
benefitted from having to follow the same penalty factors for prohibited 
practice cases in terms of section59 of the Act. I think we should look at 
merger penalties by applying different considerations that are a better fit for 
considering failures to notify. 
 
9. Whilst I support criminalizing cartel conduct I think the present provisions 
will not work. Nor do I believe the NPA has the skills or the capacity to 
prosecute cartel cases. Countries that have two different authorities enforcing 
against cartels – the competition authority against the firm applying a civil 
burden of proof and the prosecuting authority against the individual applying a 
criminal law standard have generally been far less successful than the US DOJ 
where the same institution does both. 
 
10. I am not aware of any that do for a failure to notify. 
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